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This dissertation is comprised of two essays related, broadly, to themes of 
competitive dynamics and economic consequences. In Essay One, “Many Fields of 
Battle: How Cost Structure Affects Competition across Multiple Markets,” a 
conjectural variation model is developed to examine what role cost structure and 
product differentiation play in affecting the mutual forbearance outcome arising from 
multi-market contact. The analytical results show that the degree of collusion (as 
measured by the price level) enhanced through multimarket contact is greater when 
multimarket contact occurs between firms with similar production costs and 
undifferentiated products.  This hypothesis is then tested using data from the U.S. 
airline industry. The empirical results provide support for the view suggesting that 
multimarket contact blunts the edge of competition between firms. Moreover, it is 
found that rival carriers with similar production costs are more likely to experience 
  
such collusion facilitating effects from multimarket contact than those with dissimilar 
production costs.  The second essay in this dissertation is entitled, “A Two-Location 
Inventory Model with Transshipments in a Competitive Environment.” In this study, 
an analytical model is developed to assess the impact of transshipments on inventory 
replenishment decisions and the implications for firm profitability in a competitive, 
uncertain market environment.  To incorporate the competition between stocking 
locations, the analytical model developed in this paper uses a marketing variable, 
customer’s switching rate, to measure the probability of an individual consumer 
choosing an alternative source of supply in the event of stockout.  In such an 
environment, firms not only cooperate through the practice of transshipments but also 
compete for business.  A number of interesting conclusions are drawn from numerical 
optimization results. For instance, it is found that when firms differ in market 
demand, small firms benefit more from transshipments than do large firms. In 
addition, it is shown that there is an inverted u-shaped relationship between 
transshipment price and the profit improvements that large firms gain through 
transshipments, whereas such benefits are monotonically decreasing with 
transshipment price for small firms. These findings provide several managerial 
implications with regard to the role of transshipment price in creating benefits for 












STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS AND MARKET OUTCOMES:  













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Dr. Martin E. Dresner (Chair) 
Department of Logistics, Business and Public Policy 
Dr. Robert J. Windle (Co-chair) 
Department of Logistics, Business and Public Policy 
Dr. Philip T. Evers  
Department of Logistics, Business and Public Policy 
Dr. Wilbur Chung 
Department of Logistics, Business, and Public Policy 
Dr. Gang-Len Chang 












































I am truly thankful to Dr. Martin Dresner, my advisor and co-chair of my dissertation. 
Martin has provided me with extraordinary help and support, leading me through the 
challenging and valuable experience that I have had in writing this dissertation 
required to fulfill my Ph.D. studies at the University of Maryland. He has always 
been inspiring, encouraging, and supportive. I owe an enormous amount of debt to 
Martin, who took the time and effort to teach me how to improve my dissertation in 
each of the following aspects: the development of research ideas, the use of research 
tools, the exploration of managerial implications from research, and the writing and 
revision of the paper. Every achievement that I have made at each stage of my 
dissertation would have been impossible without receiving lots of help and 
encouragement from Martin.  
 
My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Dr. Robert Windle, the co-chair of my dissertation 
committee.  Bob gave me much help recognizing and correcting several technical 
mistakes that I have made at earlier stages of my dissertation work. I am grateful to 
Bob for his patience and guidance in helping me find accurate solutions to these 
problems.  My dissertation has greatly benefited from the many insightful comments 
and constructive suggestions that Bob made with respect to arriving at good research 
questions, addressing the questions using appropriate methods, and finding the 





I am also grateful to Dr. Philip Evers, a key advisor in my study of transshipments.  
Phil has conducted much research in this field. When I told him about my interests in 
studying transshipments, he introduced me to much of the previous literature in this 
area. More importantly, Phil helped me find an interesting question to examine. My 
idea to study transshipments between rivals was formed during one of our several 
research meetings.  Afterwards, Phil guided and encouraged me to develop an 
analytical model assessing the benefits from transshipments in a competitive 
environment. In the future, I hope to follow Phil’s advice and incorporate simulation 
analyses into my transshipment research.  I also owe great thanks to Phil for offering 
me advice on specific revisions of earlier drafts of my dissertation.  
 
I also would like to extend my deep gratitude to my other committee members – 
Professors Gang-Len Chang and Wilbur Chung. Their insightful comments and 
constructive feedback after attending my dissertation proposal have greatly helped me 
improve my dissertation.  I am particularly thankful to Wilbur for giving me valuable 
advice on paper submissions and the use of STATA in statistical tests.  In addition, I 
would like to acknowledge my appreciation to several other scholars who were not on 
my dissertation committee but provided me with generous help and suggestions at 
various stages of my dissertation study: Professors Curt Grimm, Tae Oum, Brian 
Ratchford, Roland Rust, P.K. Kannan, and Paul Iyogun. I would especially like to 
thank Curt Grimm for the inspiration and encouragement he gave me in extending my 
current study of multimarket contact competition to a more general industrial setting. 




an early draft of my mulitmarket contact study at the Allied Social Sciences 
Association conference in Boston. My gratitude goes, as well, to Brian Ratchford, 
Roland Rust, and P.K. Kannan, who read an earlier draft of my multimarket paper 
and provided me with suggestions in developing my analytical model.  Finally, 
special thanks go to Paul Iyogun for his suggestion of studying the practice of 
transshipments between asymmetric firms, which certainly helped enrich my 
dissertation. 
 
I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to my fellow Ph.D. students for their 
support given to me in my proposal defense and my final dissertation defense. My 
thanks to Adriana Rossiter Hofer, Christian Hofer, Tobin Porterfield, John 
Macdonald, Xiang Wan, Dina Ribbink, David Cantor, Chao-Dong Han, and Rodrigo 
Britto. Lastly, but not least, I am infinitely grateful to my beloved parents, Furong Liu 
and Pengling Zou, for their understanding and encouragement throughout all these 
past years when I was away from home studying in pursuit of my Ph.D. degree. This 









Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................... ii 
 
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................... v 
 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... vi 
 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. vii 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
 
Chapter 2: Essay One - Many Fields of Battle: How Cost Structure Affects 
Competition across Multiple Markets........................................................................... 7 
1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 7 
2. Theoretical Model............................................................................................... 12 
2.1 Model Setup .................................................................................................. 13 
2.2 Numerical Examples..................................................................................... 25 
3. Empirical Analysis.............................................................................................. 34 
3.1 Hypotheses.................................................................................................... 35 
3.2 Empirical Models.......................................................................................... 36 
3.3 Data ............................................................................................................... 40 
3.4 Measurement of Multimarket Contact – MMC ............................................ 41 
3.5 Estimation of Airline Expenses/ASM........................................................... 42 
4. Results................................................................................................................. 44 
5. Conclusions and Implications ............................................................................. 50 
 
Chapter 3: Essay Two - A Two-Location Inventory Model with Transshipments in a 
Competitive Environment........................................................................................... 53 
1. Introduction......................................................................................................... 53 
2. The Model........................................................................................................... 60 
3. Transshipments in a Competitive Decision-Making Environment..................... 72 
3.1 Optimal Inventory Decision without Transshipments .................................. 72 
3.2 Optimal Inventory Decision with Transshipments ....................................... 80 
4. Transshipments in a Cooperative Decision-Making Environment..................... 86 
4.1 Optimal Inventory Decision without Transshipments .................................. 87 
4.2 Optimal Inventory Decision with Transshipments ....................................... 91 
5. Numerical Examples........................................................................................... 97 
5.1 Results for Example 1................................................................................... 98 
5.2 Results for Example 2................................................................................. 108 
5.3 Results for Example 3................................................................................. 136 
6. Conclusions and Future Research..................................................................... 142 
 






List of Tables 
Table II-1: The Values for Market Demand Parameters, ia and
'
ia , under Various 
Scenarios ............................................................................................................. 16 
Table II-2: The Values for Key Parameters Associated with Firms 1 and 2 .............. 32 
Table II-3: Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables............................................. 42 
Table II-4: Low-Cost and Hight-Cost Carriers........................................................... 44 
Table II-5: Estimation Results for Model One ........................................................... 45 
Table II-6: Estimation Results for Model Two........................................................... 46 
Table II-7: Correlation among Market Structure Variables........................................ 47 
 
Table III-1: Notations for Key Parameters and Variables used in the Model ............ 63 
Table III-2: Key Values for Events I, II, and III......................................................... 73 
Table III-3: Key Values for Events IV, V, and VI...................................................... 73 
Table III-4: Variable Notations and Definitions......................................................... 76 
Table III-5: Events and Associated Key Values ......................................................... 80 
Table III-6: Key Values for Events I, II, and III......................................................... 88 
Table III-7: Key Values for Events IV, V, and VI...................................................... 88 
Table III-8: Events and Associated Key Values ......................................................... 91 
Table III-9: Events and Associated Key Values ......................................................... 95 
Table III-10: Notations for Key Parameters ............................................................... 96 
Table III-11: Assumed Values for Relevant Cost Parameters .................................... 98 
Table III-12: The Impacts of Transshipments on Performance Outcomes............... 110 
Table III-13: Event Revenues for Large and Small Firms........................................ 119 
Table III-14: Expressions for Key Parameters.......................................................... 134 
Table III-15: Expressions for Key Parameters.......................................................... 135 





List of Figures 
Figure II-1: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices in Single and Multimarket Settings. 28 
Figure II-2: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices in Single and Multimarket Settings. 29 
Figure II-3: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices in Single and Multimarket Settings. 30 
Figure II-4: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices for Low-cost Firm in Single and 
Multimarket Settings........................................................................................... 33 
Figure II-5: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices for High-cost Firm in Single and 
Multimarket Settings........................................................................................... 34 
 
Figure III-1: An Illustration of the Scenario with Transshipments............................. 64 
Figure III-2: An Illustration of the Scenario without Transshipments ....................... 64 
Figure III-3: Graphic Illustration of Scenarios ........................................................... 70 
Figure III-4: Inventory Level Comparison ................................................................. 99 
Figure III-5: Profit Comparison ................................................................................ 100 
Figure III-6: Inventory Level Comparison ............................................................... 102 
Figure III-7: Profit Comparison ................................................................................ 105 
Figure III-8: Inventory Level Comparison ............................................................... 106 
Figure III-9: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments...................................... 108 
Figure III-10: The Impact of Transshipment on Firm’s Inventory Level................. 112 
Figure III-11: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments for Large Firm........... 113 
Figure III-12: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments for Small Firm........... 114 
Figure III-13: Graphic Illustration of Scenarios for Different Transshipment Prices
........................................................................................................................... 115 
Figure III-14: Graphic Illustration of Scenarios for Different Transshipment Prices
........................................................................................................................... 117 
Figure III-15: Event Probability and Transshipment Price....................................... 118 
Figure III-16: Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events I, II, and III............. 120 
Figure III-17: Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events IV, V, and VI.......... 124 
Figure III-18: Expected Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events I, II, and III
........................................................................................................................... 125 
Figure III-19: Expected Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events IV, V, and VI
........................................................................................................................... 126 
Figure III-20: Expected Revenues vs. Inventory Costs with Transshipments.......... 127 
Figure III-21: Expected Profits with Transshipments............................................... 128 
Figure III-22: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments in Various Competitive 
Settings.............................................................................................................. 129 
Figure III-23: The Impacts of Transshipments on Joint Inventories of Firms.......... 130 
Figure III-24: The Impacts of Transshipments on Joint Profits of Firms ................. 131 
Figure III-25: The Profit Impact of the Transshipment Strategy that Maximizes Joint 
Benfits ............................................................................................................... 132 
Figure III-26: Inventory Levels Under Various Competitive Settings ..................... 137 
Figure III-27: Profit Outcomes under Various Competitive Settings....................... 138 
Figure III-28: Inventory Levels at Various Transshipment Prices ........................... 139 




Figure III-30: Inventory Levels for Small Firm with and without Transshipments . 140 
Figure III-31: Inventory Levels for Large Firm with and without Transshipments . 140 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
Multimarket contact competition describes a situation where the same firms compete 
with each other simultaneously in multiple markets. As the foundation of multimarket 
competition theory, the mutual forbearance view suggests an inverse relationship 
between multimarket contact and the intensity of interfirm rivalry. According to this 
view, as compared to a single market competition, multimarket contact endows firms 
with more opportunities to act in response to the strategic behaviors of rival firms. In 
other words, multimarket contact competition provides firms with greater 
opportunities to reward competitors if they “behave” by sustaining collusive 
outcomes, and to enact punishment if rival firms deviate from the collusive outcomes.   
 
There has been an extensive body of research empirically investigating mutual 
forbearance and its ability to reduce competitive intensity. For example, Evans and 
Kessides (1994) estimate the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the U.S. 
airline industry. They find that airfares are higher in those city-pair markets served by 
carriers with extensive inter-route contacts. This result provides support for the 
mutual forbearance hypothesis, suggesting that multimarket contact reduces the 
rivalry intensity between firms, thus leading to a high market price. In an analytical 
study of multimarket contact and tacit collusion, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) also 
find evidence that multimarket contact facilitates collusive behaviors. Moreover, they 
show that the market price sustained among mutimarket competitors is even higher 
when the rival firms have dominant market positions in different markets, an effect 




follows. When two firms (e.g., Firm 1 and 2) compete in Markets A and B, and the 
two firms have dominant positions in different markets (i.e., Firm 1 is the main player 
in Market A, and Firm 2 is the key player in Market B), each firm’s incentive to 
compete aggressively in the other firm’s focal market is restrained by the retaliatory 
threat of its rival in the market where the firm has a strong position.   
 
The development of theories about multimarket contact competition has benefited 
from a growing body of empirical literature and from many well-established 
theoretical models analyzing firm collusive behaviors. However, none of previous 
studies has examined the moderating role that cost plays in the relationship between 
multimarket contact and competitive intensity.  An important question is whether the 
mutual forbearance outcome will be achieved when rival firms incur substantially 
different production costs and have differentiated products.  The rationales for 
viewing production cost as an important moderating factor are two-fold. First, the 
conjectural variation1 one firm has with respect to another is presumed to be higher 
when the two rival firms incur similar production costs than when their production 
costs are dissimilar. Moreover, it is expected that the cross-price demand elasticities 
between products provided by firms having similar production costs will be greater 
than between firms with dissimilar production costs. This presumption is based on the 
rationale that products have a great degree of substitutability when they are produced 
by firms with similar production costs.  Conjectural variation and cross-price 
elasticity are two main factors affecting the degree of tacit-collusion that firms sustain 
in the multimarket contact setting.   As a result, the tacit cooperation opportunities 
1 Conjectural variation measures the extent of price movement that one firm expects or perceives 




enlarged by multimarket contact may be related to the relative costs of the competing 
firms.   
 
The first essay in this dissertation theoretically and empirically examines the 
occurrence of multimarket contact between firms with different production costs and 
its impact on the market price sustained. In the analytical section of Essay 1, a 
conjectural variation model is developed to explore the pricing decisions made by 
firms competing simultaneously across multiple markets. In comparing tacit-
colluding prices firms sustain in single market competition with those that occur 
through multimarket contact, the analytical results suggest that the degree of collusion 
(as measured by the price level) facilitated by multimarket contact is greater between 
firms with similar production costs.  This proposition is then tested using airline data 
from the top 1,000 U.S. domestic origin and destination routes in 2002. The empirical 
findings suggest that mutlimarket contact reduces competitive intensity between 
carriers and leads to higher airfares. This result confirms the long-standing view of 
mutual forbearance.  The findings also suggest that the degree to which multimarket 
contact impacts airfares depends on the relative costs of the carriers in a market.  It is 
found that multimarket contact has a greater positive effect on price when rival 
carriers have similar production costs; when rival carriers have dissimilar production 
costs, multimarket contact has little impact on a carrier’s yields (i.e., average one-way 





The second strategic behavior addressed in this dissertation is the practice of 
transshipments between competing firms selling in markets with uncertain, 
asymmetrical demands. Transshipments refer to the practice of transferring goods 
from the location with excess stock to satisfy the demand at the location with 
insufficient stock. As a risk-pooling strategy, it has been widely applied in several 
industries, especially in those industries where the distribution lead time is long, the 
product selling season is short, the products are high-valued goods, and the local 
consumer market is unpredictable. Under these circumstances, transshipments are 
often observed to be made between stores that belong to the same chain. Take fashion 
or upper-end clothes store as an example. Suppose one Gap store in a local mall is 
stocked out of a particular size or style of an item, then another Gap store in a nearby 
mall might transship the product to the out-of-stock store. In this case, transshipments 
are implemented between firms that operate under the same corporate umbrella. 
Transshipments are initiated either voluntarily, or mandated by the company’s 
headquarter. This type of transshipment has been well studied in previous literature.   
 
An alternative setting for transshipments is examined by the second essay in this 
dissertation. In this setting, transshipments are implemented among firms that 
compete with one another.  An example would be the transshipment of auto vehicles 
between independent car dealers.  In this case, the two dealers may be located in 
fairly close proximity and distribute the same brand of automobile, but are 
independently owned.  More importantly, the two car dealers not only cooperate 




out of a particular model, potential customers of this dealer might simply divert to a 
neighboring dealer and make purchase there. From this perspective, these two car 
dealers are head-to-head competitors. In this case, a critical decision facing each car 
dealer is whether to implement transshipments with other dealers.  
 
In Essay 2, a two-location distribution model is developed to explore the following 
questions: (1) How do transshipments between rival firms affect their inventory 
decision-making and what are the performance outcomes? (2) When does a 
transshipment strategy benefit firms that are head-to-head competitors? (3) How are 
the benefits from transshipments shared among the firms? (4) Is there a transshipment 
price that will allow both competitors to increase their profits?   
 
Through transshipments, firms can save inventory costs without impairing customer 
service levels, as measured by fill rates or stockouts.  It has been well recognized that 
transshipments enable firms to share inventories and pool demand variability. 
However, the question that remains whether the strategy of transshipments will 
provide benefits when firms are direct rivals. In this setting, firms’ ex ante inventory 
replenishment decisions are interrelated through the implementation of 
transshipments.  Specifically, one firm’s stock level decision has an external negative 
impact on another firm’s inventory decision.  For example, when one firm carries a 
large inventory, the other firm tends to hold a small inventory because transshipments 
make it possible for the firm with small inventory to rely upon the large inventory 




small inventory, the other firm tends to hold a large inventory because transshipments 
make it easier for the firm with large inventory to dispose of its extra stock when 
overstocks occur. In these situations, firms will, in most cases, benefit from a 
coordinated inventory policy. In a competitive setting, however, inventory 
coordination may not be as feasible. Thus, it is important to see if there exists an 
incentive mechanism (e.g., the use of an appropriate transshipment price) that can 
lead to positive outcomes for both firms.  Building upon the analytical model, several 
numerical examples are used in Essay 2 to compare the performance outcomes under 
various competitive environments.  The results suggest that first, transshipment price 
matters in a competitive environment; secondly, when the two firms are identical, 
there exists a transshipment price that is optimal for both firms; and finally, when the 
two firms are not identical, the smaller firm will prefer a lower transshipment price, 
and will achieve greater benefits from transshipments.  
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II presents the 
study of multimarket contact for firms having different production costs and selling 
differentiated products. In Chapter III, the practice of transshipments between two 
rival firms is modeled and the results from numerical examples are provided.  Chapter 
IV summarizes a number of key findings and managerial implications that are drawn 







Chapter 2: Essay One - Many Fields of Battle: How Cost 
Structure Affects Competition across Multiple Markets 
1. Introduction 
Multimarket contact refers to situations when the same firms simultaneously compete 
in multiple markets. This type of competition occurs when firms produce multiple 
product lines, diversify into several industries, or operate in different geographical 
markets. When firms compete in a multimarket context, potential and actual 
interactions across markets serve to affect the strategic behaviors of firms. Edwards 
(1955) is the first to make the point:  
When two firms meet in multiple product or geographic markets, they may 
hesitate to contest a given market vigorously for fear of retaliatory attacks in other 
markets that erodes the prospective gain in that market.    
Since then, this mutual forbearance view has become the fundamental theory of 
multipoint competition research and has found consistent support in the context of 
many industries, especially in the airline industry (e.g., Evans & Kessides 1994; 
Morrison et al 1996; Baum & Korn 1996 and 1999; Gimeno 1999). According to 
mutual forbearance theory, firms that meet simultaneously in multiple markets will 
compete less intensely with one another. Evans and Kessides (1994) are among the 
first authors to examine empirically the effect of multimarket contact on pricing in the 
U.S. airline industry. They find that airfares are higher on city-pair routes served by 
carriers with more overlapping routes in common.  
 
As an extension of mutual forbearance theory, the spheres of influence view suggests 
that the inverse relationship between multimarket contact and rivalry intensity is 




The presence of asymmetric territorial interests endows firms with opportunities to 
retaliate in markets that are more important to their competitors. In this way, a firm 
behaves less aggressively in a rival firm’s dominant market in exchange for the rival 
firm’s similar subordination in its turf market. Gimeno (1999) offers empirical 
evidence for the spheres of influence argument. Using data from the U.S. airline 
industry, Gimeno (1999) finds that airlines restrain their competitive behaviors in 
their rival firms’ important markets so as to reduce the competitive intensity of those 
rival firms in the airline’s own dominant markets.  
 
The cooperation facilitating effect of multimarket contact has also been extended to 
study the dynamic characteristics of competitive interactions among multimarket 
competitors. Morrison et al. (1996) estimate the effect of multimarket contact on the 
probability of an airline fare war. According to the mutual forbearance theory, 
multimarket contact facilitates carrier cooperation and thus reduces the occurrence of 
fare wars. On the other hand, multimarket contact exposes carriers to competition 
over more routes on which one carrier’s price cuts could initiate retaliation from rival 
carriers on other routes, thereby leading to a greater likelihood of fare wars. 
Analyzing the quarterly fare changes on the top 1,000 U.S. domestic routes in 1993, 
Morrison et al. (1996) find no empirical evidence for the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis. Instead, their results indicate that multimarket contact increases the 





Recently, an inverted U-shape relationship between multimarket contact and 
competitive interactions among multimarket rivals has been proposed and received 
empirical support (Baum & Korn 1996 and 1999; Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006).  
Baum and Korn (1996 and 1999) find that an increase in multimarket contact raises 
an airline’s rate of market entry into and exit from other airlines’ markets when the 
level of multimarket contact between rival carriers is low; multimarket contact, 
however, has a negative impact on an airline’s rates of entry into and exit from other 
airlines’ routes when multimarket contact between rival carriers grows beyond a 
threshold level. As pointed out by Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2006), the strategies of 
entry into new markets or exit from existent markets are purposefully utilized by 
firms to increase or decrease the extent of multimarket contact with their rivals. The 
findings of an inverted U-shape relationship between multimarket contact and entry 
rates provide support for the argument that when the level of multimarket contact 
between two rival firms is low, both firms intentionally use entry strategy to establish 
a foothold in the rival’s markets so as to signal capabilities to retaliate against any 
aggressive attacks. Once the level of multimarket contact rises beyond a certain level, 
rival firms get more familiar with one another and are better able to recognize the 
interdependence of competing simultaneously across multiple markets. As such, 
multimarket contact serves to restrain aggressive actions and deter further entries of 
multimarket rivals (Fuentelsaz and Gomez 2006; Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985).     
 
Most anecdotal evidence so far provides empirical support for a negative relationship 




Rhoades, 1976; Feinberg 1985; Singal 1996; Jan and Rosenbaum 1996; Parker and 
Roller 1997; Fernandes and Marin 1998; Gimeno and Woo 1999). In these prior 
studies, several moderating factors have been incorporated into studying the negative 
effect of multimarket contact on rivalry intensity, as measured by the price level. 
Such factors include firm size (Baum and Korn 1999), market concentration (Jans and 
Rosenbaum 1996; Fernandes and Marin 1998), and spheres of influence (Gimeno 
1999).  However, there has been no attempt to investigate the impact of firm cost 
structure on the relationship between multimarket contact and the intensity of 
competition.  
 
In this article, we first investigate the question as to whether multimarket contact 
reduces competitive intensity when it occurs between firms producing outputs at the 
same marginal cost, which is invariant throughout markets, and when markets are 
identical.  Under these circumstances, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) suggest that 
multimarket contact is irrelevant and does not facilitate collusion. On the contrary, we 
show that when the conjectural variations firms have with respect to each other and 
the cross price elasticity between rival firms are positive, multimarket contact always 
restrains competitive behavior, thus facilitating tacit collusion. The non-zero values 
for conjectural variation and cross price elasticity make strategic interactions between 
multimarket rivals interdependent across markets: the optimal price firms choose in 
one market depends on prices realized in other markets. The question of whether 
aggressive pricing by a firm in one of its markets leads to loss or gain in other 




firm has with respect to its rival firms indicates the degree of retaliation that the firm 
perceives or expects its rival firms might take in any market. Second, the positive 
cross-price elasticities between the firm and its competing firms imply that their 
products are strategic substitutes, rather than complements. As such, the 
counterattacking prices initiated by rival firms lead to demand loss and reduce the 
firm’s profitability in other markets. Under these two conditions, the punishing 
effects occurring simultaneously in more than one market are greater than the 
aggregate effects of those retaliations arising from any individual market and, as a 
result, multimarket contact serves to restrain competitive behaviors and fosters 
implicit colluding actions.   
 
The second question to be addressed in this paper is whether multimarket contact 
between firms with similar production costs has a different competitive effect than 
multimarket contact between firms with dissimilar production costs. To analyze the 
collusion-facilitating effect of multimarket contact, we develop a conjectural variation 
model in which the tacit-colluding price in the single market setting is compared with 
the price in a multimarket contact setting. The analytical results reveal first, firms 
benefit more from a high tacit-colluding price in the multimarket contact setting, as 
compared to the single market setting; and second, the profit improvements resulting 
from tacit collusive pricing in the context of multimarket contact are greater when 
multimarket rivals have similar production costs than the case when multimarket 





Our empirical analysis in the context of the U.S domestic airline industry bears out 
the theoretical propositions. The results support the longstanding view that 
multimarket contact reduces interfirm rivalry intensity. Moreover, the collusion-
enhancing effect of multimarket contact is more likely to be found between carriers 
with similar production costs. By contrast, there is no such effect when multimarket 
contact occurs between carriers having dissimilar production costs.   
 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
model and the results drawn from a series of numerical examples.  In Section 3, we 
discuss hypotheses, empirical models, data and methodology. Section 4 summarizes 
the findings from our empirical analysis. The final section concludes and discusses 
implications for management and regulations.   
2. Theoretical Model 
In this section, we develop a conjectural variation model2 to analyze firm collusive  
behavior in the setting of multimarket contact. To examine the potential effects of 
multimarket contact on collusive behavior, we compare the single market tacit 
colluding price with the tacit colluding price under multimarket contact.  Although 
we focus on the case of two firms competing in two markets, the analysis and its 
conclusion can be extended to the case where n-firms meet with one another in m-
markets. 
                                                 




2.1 Model Setup 
Consider two firms, referred to as Firm 1 and Firm 2, competing in Market A or 
Market B, when they meet in a single market; and competing in Markets A and B 
when they meet in multimarkets. First, we assume that Firms 1 and 2 have identical 
production costs and that their products are highly substitutable. By comparing the 
tacit-colluding prices that firms sustain in single and multimarket settings, we 
investigate the question of whether multimarket contact facilitates collusive behavior 
when firms produce outputs at the same marginal cost, which is invariant across 
markets. Then, we consider that Firm 1 is a low-cost firm producing inferior goods, 
whereas Firm 2 is a high-cost firm providing superior goods. In this case, we assume 
that their products become less substitutable and the conjectural variations one firm 
has with respect to the other are lower as compared to those associated with the first 
scenario. The demand functions we use for Firms 1 and 2 in Market A or B are:  
21111 dppeaq +−=     (1.1)  
12222 dppeaq +−=    (1.2) 
where 1p and 2p are the prices charged by Firms 1 and 2, respectively. These demand 
functions have been used by Singh and Vives (1984) to study the price and quantity 
competition in a differentiated duopoly setting and by Dixit (1979) to analyze the 
entry choice of new firms producing differentiated products and facing an established 
firm with demand (cost) advantage. To derive demand structures in a duopoly setting 
for firms producing differentiated products, we follow Dixit (1979) and Singh and 
Vives (1984) by assuming that there is an economy consisting of two sectors: a 




competitive numeraire3 sector. Since there is no income effect on the duopoly 
section, the demand for each firm can be determined by partial derivative equilibrium 
analysis of the utility function (i.e., ),( 21 qqU ), which represents the level of 
satisfaction that consumers derive from consuming iq amount of goods of Firm i (i 
=1, 2). The quadratic and strictly concave utility function, ),( 21 qqU , is specified as 




11221121 qqqqqqqqU βγβαα ++−+=   (1.3) 
where ,, ii βα and γ are all positive, indicating, respectively, that these two products 
are normal goods, satisfy the property of decreasing marginal utility, and substitute 
with one another.  Building upon this utility formation, we can express the parameters 



















d  for i, j =1, 2, and ji ≠ .  
 
In these demand functions, the positive sign on parameters 1e , 2e suggests that market 
demand for the products of Firm 1 (2) decreases with the firm’s own price 1p ( )2p ; 
the positive parameter d indicates that demand for the products of Firm 1 or 2 
increases with the price of the competitor, as their products are substitutes.  
                                                 
3 In partial equilibrium analysis, the entire economy is considered as a two-good model. In this model, 
the expenditure on all commodities other than that under consideration is assumed as a single 
composite commodity. Such a hypothetical composite commodity is known as numerial commodity 
and the assumption on numerial commodity helps the exclusion of income effect, thereby simplifying 




For the second scenario where Firms 1 and 2 sell products of different qualities 
incurring different production costs, we incorporate service premium, s, and 
substitution degrading factor, h, into the utility function (1.3). Herein, the revised 
utility function that applies to the case when two firms produce outputs with different 




' qqqhqqsqqqU βγβαα +−+−++=   (1.4) 
This utility function differs from (1.3) in two aspects. First, the positive parameter, s, 
represents the quality/service premium that is associated with products provided by 
the high-cost firm, or Firm 2. Secondly, the positive value for parameter h implies 
that as a result of such product differentiation, the degree of substitutability between a 
high quality product and a low quality product is less than that between two high or 
two low quality products.  
 
Using utility Function (1.4), we get the inverse demand functions for Firms 1 and 2 
under the condition that the two firms have different production costs and their 















22 pdpeaq +−=    (1.6) 















































these parameters with those derived in the scenario where Firms 1 and 2 have 
identical production cost, we find first, dd <' , indicating that the cross-price effects 
on demand are smaller when two firms have distinct production costs; second, ii ee <
' , 
implying that the own-price effects on demand are smaller when two firms have 
different production costs; and finally, the sign for the difference between ia and 
'
ia is 
determined by service premium, s, and substitution degrading factor, h.  For example, 




s as the 
production costs and the resulting product qualities of the two firms become 
dissimilar.  On the other hand, the demand for Product 2, which is a high quality 






s .   Table 1, below, presents the values for 
parameters ia and
'
ia , as derived from utility Functions (1.3) and (1.4), respectively.  
Table II-1: The Values for Market Demand Parameters, ia and
'
ia , under Various 
Scenarios 











































The parameters shown in the top row of Table 1 are for the case when the products 
provided by Firms 1 and 2 are of same quality. The bottom row in the table presents 
the parameters associated with differentiated products under the assumption that the 
low-cost firm provides low quality goods, while the high-cost firm provides high 




strategy implemented by the high-cost firm has both positive and negative impacts on 
its market demand. On the positive side, the product produced by the high-cost firm 
becomes more appealing to customers because of the enhanced quality; on the other 
side, such added quality or service premium makes the high-end products less 
substitutable with the low-end products. Jointly, these two effects might enlarge or 
shrink the market demand for the products provided by the high-cost firm, depending 
upon the increased value for service premium, s, relative to the degree of decreased 
substitutability, as measured by h.  
 
We also find that although the low-end products are less attractive to consumers, the 
low-cost firm might, instead, face an enlarged market demand as a result of the 
reduction in product substitutability. Specifically, it can be shown that the low-cost 
firm has greater demands in the differentiated product market as compared to the non-













when ααα == 21 and βββ == 21 ; in addition, the high-cost firm has greater 
demands in the differentiated product market as compared to the non-differentiated 






s  when 
ααα == 21 and βββ == 21 . Finally, it can be shown that when the following 
equality )( 122112 ααγαβαβ −=− holds, Firms 1 and 2 have identical demand 
parameters (i.e. )21 aa =  for the scenario where the two firms compete in the non-




differentiated product market, they have identical demand parameters (i.e., '2
'
1 aa = ) 
when  ))(()( 1221 hsh −++=−+ γβαγβα .  
 
Now we assume that firms have constant marginal costs in Markets A and B. Firm 1’s 
marginal cost is denoted by 1c . The marginal cost for Firm 2 is 2c . There are no fixed 
costs for Firms 1 and 2 in either Market A or B.  
 
Given the above cost assumptions and inverse demand Functions (1.1) and (1.2), the 
profit for Firm 1 in Market A can be written as the following when Firms 1 and 2 are 
assumed to have identical production costs:  
))(( 1121111 cppdpea
AAAAAA −+−=π    (1.7) 
Under the scenario where Firms 1 and 2 have identical production costs, Firm 2’s 
profit in Market A is:  
))(( 2212222 cppdpea
AAAAAA −+−=π    (1.8)  
For Firm i (i =1, 2) to achieve positive profit outcomes, it is required that the price 
charged by Firm i be greater than its marginal cost (i.e., 0>− i
A
i cp ) and the demand 




ii pdpea ).  
 
In the following section, we first derive the tacit-colluding prices for firms having 
identical production costs in both settings of single market and multimarket contact. 
In a similar way, we next derive the tacit-colluding prices for firms having different 




the two firms have different production costs, we use inverse demand functions 
specified in (1.5) and (1.6) to derive the profit functions for Firms 1 and 2, separately.   
 
We make a further assumption that each firm perceives the price set by its rival as a 
function of its own price. Thus, each firm has an expectation on the direction and 
magnitude of the rival firm’s price movement in responding to its own price change. 
Two variables, denoted as Av1 , and 
Av2 , measure, respectively, the conjectural 















dpv . Then the first-order condition for Firm 1 to maximize its profit in 










∂π   (1.9) 










∂π   (1.10) 
        
Solving a system of equations (1.9) = 0, and (1.10) =0, we get the single market tacit-
colluding prices for Firms 1 and 2 as the following:  
),,,,,,,,,( 212121212111 ccvvddeeaafp
AAAAAAAA =  
















AAAAAAAA =  









−++−−+++   
(1.12)  
 
The second-order condition requires that the conjectural variations for Firms 1 and 2 
satisfy the following inequalities: AAA evd 11 < , and
AAA evd 22 < . The restrictions imposed 
on these parameters imply that the firm’s own price change impacts its demand level 
more than does the rival firm’s follow-up retaliating price movement. Similar results 
can be drawn for Market B.  
 
Now, consider the case when Firms 1 and 2 compete in multiple markets; i.e., 
Markets A and B. Given the above assumptions on demand functions and marginal 
costs, the total profit that Firm 1 obtains from selling to both Markets A and B is 




BBBBBAAAAABA −+−+−+−=π  (1. 13) 
 
When Firms 1 and 2 compete in Markets A and B simultaneously, Firm 1’s pricing 
behavior in Market A might initiate its rival’s reaction not only in Market A but 
Market B as well. We use AAv1  to denote the pricing responses that Firm 1 perceives 
Firm 2 would take in Market A as a reaction to its price change made in Market A, 
and BAv1 to denote the perceived pricing response of Firm 2 in Market B following 
Firm 1’s pricing action in Market A. Further, ABv1 and 
BBv1 represent the expected 




pricing action in Market B. Similarly, Firm 2 has its conjectural variations denoted 
by: ,,, 222
ABBAAA vvv and BBv2 .  
 
Differentiating (1.13) with respect to Ap1 , 
Bp1 , we obtain the first-order-conditions for 






















∂π           (1.15) 
Equation (1.14) shows us how the aggregate profit for Firm 1 in Markets A and B 
changes with the price that Firm 1 sets in Market A. By comparing expression (1.14) 
with (1.9), we can easily find that the profit effect of the price change by Firm 1 in 
Market A when Firm 1 competes with Firm 2 in both markets is different from the 
effect when these two firms meet merely in a single market; i.e., Market A.  
 
In the single market setting, Firm 1’s price change affects its profit in two ways. First, 
the market demand for Firm 1’s output varies with its price, as determined by the 
firm’s own price elasticity, and indirectly, the demand also shifts resulting from the 
reaction of the rival firm in responding to Firm 1’s price movement, as determined by 
cross-price demand elasticity. Second, the net profit margin per output is affected by 
the unit price. In comparison, when two firms simultaneously meet in more than one 
market, the price change for Firm 1 in one of these markets (e.g., Market A) has an 
extra impact on its profit as a result of the potential price responses taken by its rival 




Market A, it gets more demand in Market A, while the demand for its output in 
Market B might be reduced, as Firm 2 might decrease its price in Market B to 
retaliate against Firm 1’s aggressive pricing in Market A. This counterattack by Firm 
2 in Market B is taken into consideration by Firm 1 when deciding its price in Market 
A. The part BABvd 1 in Expression (1.14) measures the magnitude of the demand loss 
that Firm 1 is expected to suffer in Market B if it cut its price in Market A. The 
greater the perceived loss of demand in Market B, the less incentive for Firm 1 to 
price aggressively in Market A. According to the same rationale, Firm 1’s aggressive 
pricing behavior in Market B is restrained by the potential demand deteriorating 
effect arising from Firm 2’s counterattack in Market A. Therefore, the rivalry 
experienced by firms meeting in two markets simultaneously is less intense than 
when they compete in any of the two markets alone.  
 
To find tacit-colluding prices in the setting of multimarket contact, we use the total 
profit expression for Firm 2 in Markets A and B and then differentiate this equation 
with respect to Ap2 , and 




BBBBBAAAAABA −+−+−+−=π  (1.16) 
 
Given a set of non-zero conjectural variations for Firm 2, we get the first-order-

























∂π  (1.18) 
 
Solving a system of equations (1.14) = 0, (1.15) = 0, (1.17) = 0, and (1.18) = 0, we 
get the tacit-colluding prices ABA ppp 211 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ and 
Bp2ˆ for Firms 1 and 2 in a multimarket 
contact setting. The second-order condition for the profit maximization problem 
requires that the underlying parameters satisfy the following inequalities: 
(i) AAAA edv 11 < ; (ii)
BBBB edv 11 < ; (iii) 
AAAA edv 22 < ; (iv) 
BBBB edv 22 < ; (v) 
2
111111 )()22)(22(
BABABABBBBAAAA vdvdevdevd +>−− ; and (vi) 
2
222222 )()22)(22(
BABABABBBBAAAA vdvdevdevd +>−− .  
 
Now, we can study the competition restraining effects of multimarket contact by 
comparing tacit colluding prices in a single market setting with those determined in a 
multimarket contact setting. Moreover, we can investigate whether multimarket 
contact has differential effects on collusive behavior when firms have dissimilar costs 
rather than identical costs. For this purpose, several numerical examples are drawn to 
show under what conditions the collusion enhancing effects of multimarket contact 










 Proposition 1. Multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion and thus  
restrains aggressive pricing behavior when the cross-price demand effect in both 
Markets A and B are positive (i.e., Ad , Bd > 0) and firms have positive conjectural 
variations with respect to one another (i.e., ABiv , 
BA
iv  > 0, i = 1, 2).  
 
To prove this proposition, we simply need to examine whether tacitly colluding in 
price makes both firms more profitable in a multimarket contact setting than in a 
single market setting. By comparing Equation (1.14) with Equation (1.9), we find that 
the presence of term )( 111 cpvd
BBAB −  in Equation (1.14) suggests that the price change 
of Firm 1 in Market A has a different effect on its profitability when Firm 1 competes 
with Firm 2 in both Markets A and B as compared to when the two firms compete 
only in Market A. For a positive profit outcome, it is reasonable to assume that Firm 
1’s price in Market B, Bp1 , is greater than its marginal production cost, 1c . Therefore, 
the positive value for BABvd 1 implies that Firm 1 would get more profits through a 
tacit-colluding price in Market A when it meets Firm 2 in both markets as compared 
to when it meets Firm 2 in Market A alone. Similarly, the positive sign for 
ABAvd 1 suggests that the benefits arising from a tacit-colluding price in Market B are 
greater for Firm 1 when it meets Firm 2 in both markets than when it meets Firm 2 in 
Market B alone. The comparison of Equation (1.17) with (1.10) leads to the same 
results for Firm 2 as long as the following conditions hold: 02 >
BABvd  and 02 >





2.2 Numerical Examples 
We start a series of numeral examples with a symmetric one, in which the demand 
structure, marginal production cost and conjectural variations for Firm 1 are identical 
to those for Firm 2. We also assume the cross-price demand effect, the own-price 
demand effect and the conjectural variations for each firm are constant across 
markets. As for the conjectural variation, we make a further assumption that when a 
firm competes in multiple markets, its conjectural variation in a given market (e.g., 
AAv1 ) would be the same as if it only competed in a single market (e.g., 
Av1 ).  In fact, 
an empirical question remains as to whether the values for conjectural variation 
become smaller or larger when there is multimarket contact formed between rival 
firms.   
 
To help make the example realistic, we use the calculated average expense/available 
seat from our U.S. airline dataset as the value for marginal production cost ic , and the 
average market yield to derive values for the market size-related variables ia and ib . 
The set of parameters are assumed to have values as follows:  
14221 == cc  (dollars per passenger) 
21 aa = = 107, 10721 == bb  
121 ==
AA ee , 121 ==
BB ee  
6.0=Ad , 6.0=Bd  
6.021 ==
AAAA vv , 6.021 ==
BABA vv , 6.021 ==
ABAB vv , 6.021 ==




Using these values, we get the tacit-colluding prices for Firm 1 in Market A, Ap1  = 
190.27 in a single market setting; Ap1ˆ  = 215.82 under a multimarket contact setting. 
This result shows that the tacit-colluding price for Firm 1 in Market A is greater when 
Firm 1 competes with Firm 2 in two markets than the tacit-collusive price sustained in 
a single market setting. Further, we can calculate the non-tacit-colluding Nash 
equilibrium in both single and multimarket contact settings. By assuming that all 
conjectural variations are zero, i.e., 0=jkiv  (i =1, 2, j, k = A, B), we follow the 
expression for Ap1  to get the  non-tacit-colluding price of Firm 1 in Market A in the 
single market setting, and the expression for Ap1ˆ to get the corresponding non-tacit-
colluding price for a multimarket contact setting. It can be easily shown that Equation 
(1.14) has the same expression as Equation (1.9) when all conjectural variations are 
equal to zero. Under this particular case, the competitive price for Firm 1 in the single 
market setting has the same value as the price sustained in a multimarket contact 
setting. Using the assumed set of parameters, we get the competitive 
price 86.177~1 =
Ap , which is less than the tacit colluding price in both single and 
multimarket environments.  
 
Next, we decrease the assumed values for the cross-price demand effect from 0.6 to 
0.4, holding other parameters unchanged4. Using 4.0=Ad , 4.0=Bd , and other 
parameters assumed herein, we get the tacit-colluding price in the single market 
                                                 
  4 From the utility function (see Equation 1.3), we derive the expression for parameters including own-
price demand effect, ei and cross-price demand effect denoted as d. It can be shown that the difference 
between ei and d is a constant. Therefore, the value for ei changes with d. As in the baseline example, 





Ap ; the tacit-colluding price in a multimarket contact setting, 
72.211ˆ1 =
Ap ; and the competitive price Ap1~ = 183.83. Consistent with Proposition 1, 
this result implies that multimarket contact leads to a higher tacit-colluding price, or, 
lower rivalry intensity than does single market competition.  Moreover, we observe 
that the tacit colluding price enhanced through multimarket contact declines as cross-
price demand effects (i.e., Ad , Bd ) decrease while holding other parameters invariant.  
 
The above results suggest that the reduction in competition from multimarket contact, 
as evidenced by the higher equilibrium price, is increasing with the value for cross-
price elasticity, ceteris paribus. As the products of Firm 1 and Firm 2 get more 
substitutable, firms obtain greater additional benefits from tacit collusion in the 
multiple market context compared to the single market context. Figure 1 graphically 
illustrates this point, showing that the difference in the tacit colluding price between 
the multimarket and single market settings enlarges with the parameter for the cross-
price demand effect, or, jd (j = A, B).  Note that the feasible range for jd (j = A, B) is 
within [0.25, 0.85] when the set of conjectural variation parameters takes the value of 
0.6. The restrictions imposed on jd (j = A, B) serve to guarantee the strictly concave 





Figure II-1: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices in Single and Multimarket Settings 
 
It can also be shown that that the difference in tacit-colluding prices between the 
multimarket context and the single market setting varies with the levels of conjectural 
variation, ceteris paribus.  When two rival firms form high conjectural variations with 
respect to each other, they perceive greater response threats. As a result, the benefits 
from tacit-collusion in the multimarket context increase.  Figure 2 presents the tacit-
colluding prices for Firm 1 in Market A for the multimarket contact and single market 
settings. It reveals that the tacit-colluding price facilitated through multimarket 
contact rises with conjectural variation, which ranges from 0.05 to 0.8 given a fixed 
cross-price parameter jd of 0.6 (j=A, B).  Under the assumed values for other key 
parameters, the non-tacit-colluding price for Firm 1 in Market A is constant at 
857.177~1 =
Ap and is always less than the tacit colluding prices associated with both 
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Collusion, when successful, will raise price above the competitive level under single 
market competition. The more inelastic the demand for the product at the competing 
price level, the higher the collusive price that is expected to hold in the market 
(Rosenbaum and Manns 1994). As shown in Figure 3, the tacit-colluding price in a 
single market context rises when consumer demands for each firm become more 
inelastic. In contrast, the tacit-colluding price in a multimarket contact setting 
decreases as price elasticity, ei, falls from 1.35 to 0.8, ceteris paribus5.  Figure 3 also 
reveals that at a given level of own-price elasticity, the tacit-colluding price for Firm 
1 in a multimarket contact setting is higher than when Firm 1 competes with Firm 2 in 
a single market. Moreover, such an increase in price due to multimarket contact gets 
larger as the demands for Firm 1 (2)’s products become less elastic with Firm 1(2)’s 
own price. 
 
Figure II-2: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices in Single and Multimarket Settings 
 
                                                 
5 As indicated in the previous note, the value for the cross-price demand effect, d, varies with own-
price demand effect, ei. The difference between these two parameters is fixed at 0.4, as prescribed in 
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The finding that the collusion enhancing impact of multimarket contact is greater 
when a firm has a higher own-price demand effect can be explained as follows. In a 
single market setting, the nature of demand price-elasticity affects firms in making 
collusive or aggressive decisions. In a particular market environment, where demand 
is less sensitive to price, it is more likely for firms to collude. On the contrary, firms 
tend to compete more intensely in price when demand has a higher price elasticity. 
Under this situation, there will be greater potential for collusion enhancing effects 
from multimarket contact. Therefore, the increase in tacit-colluding prices as a result 
of multimarket contact will get larger as demands throughout markets become more 
sensitive to product price.  
 
 
Figure II-3: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices in Single and Multimarket Settings 
 
So far, we have shown that when markets are identical, and rival firms have identical 
positive conjectural variations and positive cross-price effects on their demand 
functions, the tacit-colluding price for firms meeting simultaneously in two markets is 
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following section, we explore whether multimarket contact has a greater impact on 
competitive behavior between two rival firms having similar production costs as 
compared to firms having dissimilar production costs.  
 
 Proposition 2. The tacit-collusion enhancing effects of multimarket contact  
are greater when it occurs between firms with similar production costs than when it 
occurs between firms with dissimilar productions costs.  
 
In the preceding section, we showed that when two firms produce differentiated 
products incurring different levels of production costs, the degree of substitutability 
between a high quality and a low quality product is less than that between two high 
quality products or two low quality products.  With the presence of a positive 
substitution degrading factor, h, the cross-price effect on demand (as denoted by d) 
will be smaller when firms have dissimilar production costs compared to when they 
have identical production costs. As products provided by the two rival firms become 
less substitutable, it is also reasonable to assume that the conjectural variation one 
firm has with respect to another declines in value. From the analytical results, we find 
that the collusion enhancing effects of multimarket contact are jointly determined by 
the value of the cross-price demand parameter, d, and the conjectural variation, v. The 
greater these parameters, the more effective multimarket contact is at facilitating 
collusive behavior. As such, the degree of implicit collusion enhanced through 
multimarket contact is greater when multimarket contact is formed between firms 




To graphically illustrate Proposition 2, we develop numerical examples in which the 
differences in production costs between Firms 1 and 2 are gradually amplified from 
zero to $56.80 (i.e., 40% of the marginal cost incurred by the high-cost firm).  Table 2 
lists a set of values for conjectural variation, v, that decrease in sync with the cross-
price demand parameter, d, as the cost differences between the two firms become 
larger. For example, when Firms 1 and 2 have identical costs of $142 per passenger, 
the values for d and v are assumed to be at the highest level of 0.8. As Firms 1 and 2 
become dissimilar in their production costs, the values for d and v are linearly 
reduced from 0.8 to zero.   
Table II-2: The Values for Key Parameters Associated with Firms 1 and 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
142 135.5 129 122.5 116 109.5 103 96.5 90 C1 
C2 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
jd  0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
jk
iv  0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
 
Other parameters used in these examples are assumed to have the following values.  
21 aa = = 185, 18521 == bb  
3.121 ==
AA ee , 3.121 ==
BB ee 6 
Using this specification, we calculate, for each pair of firm production cost levels, the 
competing prices for Firms 1 and 2 in Market A, and their corresponding tacit-
colluding prices in both single market and multimarket contact settings. Results 
                                                 
6  In the baseline Example (1), the value for own-price demand effect jie is 1.3, which ensures the 
satisfaction of the second-order condition for the profit maximization problem. In other examples from 
(2) to (9), the values for jie decline with
jd , holding the difference between these two parameters 





plotted in Figure 4 are for Firm 1 under various scenarios from (1) to (9).  Figure 5 
presents the results for Firm 2.  
    
Figure II-4: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices for Low-cost Firm in Single and 
Multimarket Settings 
 
Note that the left-most example in Figure 4 represents Scenario (1), where Firms 1 
and 2 have identical marginal production costs. With the reduction in Firm 1’s 
production cost from Scenario (2) through (9), Firms 1 and 2 have widening 
differences in their production costs, holding Firm 2’s production cost at a fixed level. 
Consistent with Proposition 2, we find from Figure 4 that the collusion facilitating 
effects of multimarket contact are greater when rival firms have identical production 
costs than when they have different levels of production cost. We also find that such 
impacts of multimarket contact on firm collusive behavior erode as the production 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
($) 
Multimarket tacit-colluding price  
for Firm 1 in Market A 
Single-market  
tacit-colluding price  
for Firm 1 in Market A 
Non-colluding price  




Figure II-5: Competing, Tacit-colluding Prices for High-cost Firm in Single and 
Multimarket Settings 
 
As shown in Figure 5, similar results hold for the high-cost firm, Firm 2. Comparing 
results in Figure 5 with those shown in Figure 4, we find that the high-cost firm 
experiences a similar pattern of collusion decreasing impacts from multimarket 
contact; that is, multimarket contact becomes less effective in facilitating collusive 
pricing behavior when the rival firms have greater dissimilarity in their production 
costs.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
The conjectural variation model and several numerical examples developed in Section 
2 illustrate how multimarket contact serves to facilitate tacit-collusive pricing 
behaviors for firms under various scenarios. The analytical results suggest that the 
mutual forbearance effect arising from multimarket contact is moderated by market-
related characteristics such as own-price and cross-price demand elasticities, and the 
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develop two hypothesis and use data from the U.S. airline industry to test them. 
Empirical evidence provides validation of the analytical results.   
3.1 Hypotheses 
The mutual forbearance view suggests that rival firms with a high degree of 
multimarket contact tend to collude rather than compete as a result of the mutual 
deterrence effect (see Proposition 1). According to this view, the rivalry intensity 
experienced by an airline on a given route is negatively related to the extent of 
multimarket contact the carrier has with its focal market rivals. In the airline industry, 
one widely used measure for rivalry intensity is yields, or airfares per mile flown 
(e.g., Evans and Kessides 1994, Gimeno 1999, and Gimeno et al. 1999). Generally 
speaking, the more intense the competition between carriers, the lower the yields that 
are expected on a given route, ceteris paribus. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is formally 
stated as:  
 
H1. The yields for a carrier on a given route are higher when the carrier has a greater 
extent of multimarket contact with its rival carriers.  
 
Through multimarket contact, firms are endowed with more opportunities to deter 
their rivals from pricing aggressively. The mutuality of such forbearance actions, 
however, may not hold when firms differ substantially in their cost structures (see 
Proposition 2). In the context of the U.S. airline industry, Dresner and Windle (1996 
and 1999) find empirical support for the point that a low-cost carriers, or LCCs, focus 




service carriers”, or FSCs, offer superior service to travelers who are not as sensitive 
to airfares. As the services offered by high-cost and low-cost carriers become more 
differentiated in quality, smaller cross-price effects on demand would be expected.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H2. Multimarket contact between carriers with similar production costs has a greater 
positive effect on yields than that between carriers with different levels of production 
costs.  
3.2 Empirical Models 
The two hypotheses are tested using data from the U.S. domestic airline market. The 
reasons why we focus on the airline industry are two-fold. First, airport-pair routes 
can be used to specify market scope without causing ambiguity. Thus, we can follow 
existing empirical studies (e.g., Evans and Kessides 1994, Baum and Korn 1999, 
Gimeno 1999, and Gimeno and Woo 1999) to measure the extent of multimarket 
contact by counting the overlapping routes served by any two carriers. More 
importantly, carrier costs in the airline industry are not private information, and cost 
differences between carriers are relatively consistent across routes. Typically, a low-
cost carrier has its cost advantage over a high-cost carrier on all the routes in which 
they compete. The main input factors, such as labor and fuel, are invariant on a per 
unit basis across routes. Some route-related costs (e.g., airport landing fees) do not 
vary across carriers for the same aircraft type. All these characteristics make this 
industry ideal to test the differential competitive effects of multimarket contact, 




To test Hypothesis 1, we follow the modeling approach by Evans and Kessides 
(1994) to estimate the reduced-form price model specified as Equation (1.19).  The 
unit analysis in our study is the yield for an individual airline on an airport-pair route.  
 
ln (Yield)ir = α0 + α1 ln (Route HHI)r + α2 ln(Route Market Share)ir+α3 ln (Airport 
HHI)r + α4 ln (Airport Market Share)ir +α5 ln (Route Distance)r +α6 ln(Market Size)r 
+α7 (Slot Controlled)r +α8 ln(MMC)ir +α9 (Low-Cost Rival)ir + 
ir
Ni
ii Carrier εα +∑
−= 1,...1
10 )(        (1.19)               
 
The dependent variable (Yield)ir is the average one-way airfare for airline, i, on route, 
r, divided by the route non-stop distance. To control for the impact of market 
concentration on airfare, we include the Herfindahl indices on both route and airport 
levels, denoted by Route HHI, and Airport HHI.  The degree of market concentration 
for a given route is calculated as the sum of squared market shares for all carriers 
flying on the route.  Similarly, Airport HHI calculates the summed squares of the 
market shares for all the airlines at a given airport. Then we use the maximum HHI at 
the two endpoint airports to measure the airport-based market concentration level for 
a particular route.  
 
A number of studies have found that an airline’s fare is positively related to its 
operation size at the route endpoint airports, well known as the hub premium effect 
(Borenstein 1989). We control for this market power effect by using (Airport Market 
Share)ir, which is the maximum of the market shares for carrier, i, at its endpoint 




having dominant positions on a particular route by using (Route Market share)ir, 
which measures the percentage of all passengers flying on route, r, that travel with 
airline, i.  Moreover, Windle and Dresner (1995) find that the presence of low-cost 
carriers in an air traveling market results in significantly lower average fares for all 
carriers on the route.  Hence, we include a dummy variable, (Low-cost Rival)ir, to 
indicate whether the focal carrier, i, has a low-cost rival on route, r.  Market 
concentration, market power, and the low-cost carrier’s participation are factors all 
affecting the actual competitive level in the airline market.  
 
The airline market is disciplined by potential competition as well. For instance, 
average airfares have been found to be higher on routes with slot-controlled endpoint 
airports. This finding supports the point that in an airline market, potential entrants 
are effectively deterred by slot control restrictions imposed on the airport. 
Accordingly, we control for this potential deterrence effect by using the dummy 
variable, (Slot Controlled)r, to indicate whether one or both endpoints on route, r, are 
slot-controlled.  
 
The other two control variables included in the reduced-form price equation are Route 
Distance, and Market Size. Route Distance refers to non-stop distance, and Market 
Size measures the total number of passengers on a given route. It is widely known that 
airline operations are characterized by economies of distance and economies of 




distance and with traffic volume. In Equation (1.19), we expect the coefficients for 
ln(Route Distance)r and ln(Market Size)r to be negative. 
   
The independent variable (MMC)ir measures the degree of multimarket contact for 
airline i on route r.  As suggested in Hypothesis 1, the greater the (MMC)ir, the lower 
the rivalry intensity between carrier i and its competitors, and thus the higher the 
airfare for carrier, i, or (Yield)ir. To take into account carrier heterogeneity, we 
incorporate firm dummy variables, (Carrier)i, in Equation (19). After controlling for 
these fixed carrier effects and market-related effects on airfares, we interpret the 
coefficient for (MMC)ir as the impact of multimarket contact on a carrier’s yield.   
 
The above empirical model is developed to estimate the overall effects of multimarket 
contact on pricing behaviors of carriers. Hypothesis 2 goes one step further by 
investigating the differential impacts of multimarket contact between carriers with 
similar cost levels, and between carriers with dissimilar cost levels. For a focal carrier 
on a given route, two additional multimarket contact variables are constructed. One 
measures the extent of the overlapping routes between the focal carrier and all of its 
rival carriers ranked in the same group according to operating expenses; the other 
measure captures the degree of multimarket contact between the focal carrier and all 
of its rival carriers belonging to the different group on the basis of operating costs. 
This approach requires that the sample carriers be grouped into low- and high-cost 





ln (Yield)ir = α0 + α1 ln (Route HHI)r +α3 ln(Route Market Share)ir + α3 ln (Airport 
HHI)r + α4 ln (Airport Market Share)ir +α5 ln (Route Distance)r +α6 ln(Market Size)r 
+α7 (Slot Controlled)r + αhh (HHMMC)ir + hlα  (HLMMC)ir+ αll (LLMMC)ir + α8 
(Low-Cost Rival)ir + ir
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9 )(                                                    (1.20) 
where (HHMMC)ir measures the multimarket contact between high-cost carrier i and 
its high-cost rivals on route, r;  the variable (LLMMC) measures the multimarket 
contact between low-cost carrier i, and its low-cost rivals on route, r; and (HLMMC)ir 
is the multimarket contact measure for high- or low-cost carrier i with all of its rivals 
positioned in the opposite cost group. From the estimated coefficients for these 
variables, we can examine whether multimarket contact between carriers with similar 
cost levels impacts collusive behaviors differently from when multimarket contact 
occurs between carriers with dissimilar cost levels.  
3.3 Data 
The data used in this study are from Department of Transportation - DB1A  
(as provided by Database Product Inc), and from the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS). DB1A contains the 10% Origin & Destination ticket survey data that 
can be used to determine a number of airline-route specific variables, such as yields 
for airport-pair markets, route distance, the average number of coupons per ticket, and 
the number of passengers on the route.  BTS provides airline financial data and 
airport-related data, for example, the total number of passengers traveling into and out 
of an airport. The sample we collected includes the top 1,000 U.S. domestic routes in 
the year 2002.  We use the complete dataset to calculate route specific characteristics, 




1% of the total passengers on a route, and carriers flying fewer than 10 routes. This 
sampling approach follows the data filtering procedure used by Evans and Kessides 
(1994).  The final sample includes 4,667 observations from 998 routes and 19 
carriers.  There are 89 endpoint airports. The 4 slot-controlled airports in the year 
2002 are: Chicago O’Hare (ORD), New York City’s John F. Kennedy and LaGuardia 
(JFK, LGA) and Washington D.C.’s Reagan National (DCA). 
3.4 Measurement of Multimarket Contact – MMC 
Multimarket contact has been measured in several different ways. The most widely 
used approach is to count the number of markets in which firms compete against one 
another. In the context of the airline industry, the number of overlapping routes 
served by airlines is used to measure the extent of multimarket contact between 
carriers (e.g., Evans and Kessides 1994; Gimeno and Woo 1996). Building on this 
measurement, we construct a carrier-route specific MMC index capturing the extent 
of multimarket contact for each carrier on the route.  First, we count the number of 







, where Dir is a dummy variable that equals 1 if airline i flies on route 
r, and 0 otherwise, and Djr equal 1 if airline j flies on route r, and 0 otherwise.  Next 
the multimarket contact MCij between airlines i and j, Aij, is scaled by the summation 



















Using this formula, the range of the value for MCij is within [0, 0.5].  Finally, the 
multimarket contact for carrier i on route r, MCir, is averaged across all of its 

















, where N is the total number of carriers in the dataset ( ji ≠ ). 
Table 3, below, presents the description and summary statistics for all the variables 
we use in the estimation.  
Table II-3: Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables 
Variable Description Mean and (Std. 
Deviation) 
Yield Average one-way airfare charged by airline i on route r. 










The percentage of passengers on route r that fly with 
airline i.  
0.1944 
(0.2421) 
Airport HHI Sum of squared market shares of all carriers at the airport. 
For carrier i on route r, the maximum HHI of the two 





The maximum market share for carrier i on the two 
endpoint airports of route r.  
0.2108 
(0.2082) 
Distance Non-stop distance on route r. [Miles] 1,296.20 
(656.45) 
Market size Total number of passengers on route r. 21,529.16 
(18120.38) 
Slot controlled  Dummy variable (1-either one or both endpoint airports 
are slot controlled). In 2002, there were four slot 
controlled airports: ORD, JFK, LGA and DCA. 
0.15 
(0.35) 
MMC Multimarket contact index for carrier i on route r. 0.2948 
(0.1038) 




3.5 Estimation of Airline Expenses/ASM 
Airlines annually report to the DOT their total operating expenses.  We use operating 




Operating Expenses/ASM is an approximate assessment of the carrier’s cost level. In 
the airline industry, operating characteristics such as stage length contribute to 
economies of distance.  Stage length is the distance of a flight leg. On average, the 
longer a carrier’s average stage length, the lower the average cost per mile incurred. 
To account for such economies of distance, we modify Expenses/ASM by using the 
elasticity of Expenses/ASM to stage length. The elasticity can be estimated by the 
following log-linear model: iii DASMExp εβ += )ln()/ln( , in which (D)i is the average 
flight length for carrier i and iε is the error term. 
 
The estimated elasticity β̂ equals -0.365. Using the estimated value for β̂ , we adjust 




ASMExpASMExp iii   







iDD ).  After the 
stage length adjustment, *)/( iASMExp  reflects the overall unit cost for each carrier. 
Taking the average *)/( iASMExp  for all carriers as a cutoff value, we classify the 
sampled carriers into high-cost and low-cost groups. Table 4 presents the ranking 





                                                 
7 The high-cost group represents, roughly, the pre-deregulation or “legacy” carriers while the low-cost 





















US Airways 0.1390 0.1253 480 684.20 H 
United Airlines 0.1139 0.1194 595 1036.05 H 
American Airlines 0.1114 0.1176 648 1054.30 H 
Midway Airlines 0.1386 0.1106 12 490.13 H 
Midwest Express 0.1154 0.1071 27 742.36 H 
Continental Airlines 0.1015 0.1054 442 1008.22 H 
Delta Airlines 0.1032 0.0979 743 788.66 H 
Northwest 
Airlines 
0.1062 0.0958 477 686.70 H 
Alaska Airlines 0.0988 0.0891 53 686.50 H 
American Trans 0.0769 0.0851 115 1200.33 L 
America West 
Airlines 
0.0809 0.0840 319 1009.32 L 
Frontier Airlines  0.0832 0.0813 126 854.92 L 
Vanguard Airlines 0.0807 0.0798 41 881.75 L 
Spirit Airlines 0.0735 0.0753 35 970.77 L 
Jet Blue Airlines 0.0643 0.0737 28 1323.50 L 
Airtran  0.0847 0.0718 154 577.72 L 
Southwest Airlines 0.0739 0.0667 399 686.30 L 
National Airlines 0.0472 0.0554 26 1408.82 L 
Sun County Airlines 0.0249 0.0235 12 775.80 L 
 
4. Results 
Tables 5 and 6, respectively, present the estimation results for Models 1 and 2, as 
shown by Equations (1.19) and (1.20).  Three versions of each of the models are 
estimated.  For Model 1, the classic OLS results show a positive and significant 
coefficient for Ln(MMC), supporting the tacit-collusion facilitating effect of 
multimarket contact. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the airfare is found to be higher 
when a carrier has extensive market contact with its rivals, holding other variables 
constant. In addition, the results show that the presence of a low-cost rival has a 
significantly negative effect on yields, suggesting that airfares are lower when a 
carrier has low-cost rivals on a route, as compared to the situation where all of its 




From the classic OLS estimation results for Model 1, we also find that airport 
concentration, and airport market share, as expected, contribute to airfare premiums 
of various magnitudes. The airport concentration variable endows the airline with the 
most pricing power, followed by airport market share. The price elasticity associated 
with Airport HHI is 0.1919, which is 3.67 times as large as the elasticity related to 
Airport Market Share.  On the other side, Route HHI is found to be negative, but 
insignificant. Moreover, we find that airfares are, ceteris paribus, higher on routes 
where either or both endpoint airports are slot controlled.   Also implied is that the 
airfares decrease as route distance, or market size increases, holding other variables 
constant.  
Table II-5: Estimation Results for Model One 








































































Number of observations 4667 4667 4667 
R2 0.7486 0.7816 0.7421 
Significant at 0.01 level a, Significant at 0.05 level b, Significant at 0.1 level c; 
The estimated coefficients for the carrier dummy variables are omitted in the column for the 
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Number of observations 4667 4667 
R2 0.7833 0.7476 
Significant at 0.01 levela, Significant at 0.05 levelb,Significant at 0.1 levelc;  
The estimated coefficients for the carrier dummy variables are omitted in the column 
for the fixed-effects model. 
 
Since Market Size is defined as the total number of passengers on a given route, this 
aggregate measure of demand is most likely to be independent of the error term in the 
airfare regression. Nevertheless, other market structure variables, such as Route HHI 
and Airport Market Share, are potentially endogenous and thus may be correlated 
with the error term, irε , in airfare regressions. To address this potential issue, we 
include carrier-specific dummy variables in our model. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 




Comparing the classic OLS results (Column 2 of Table 5) to the results from the 
fixed-effects model (Column 3), we find that the coefficients for Ln(MMC) and for 
Ln(Airport Market Share) estimated by the fixed-effect model are twice as large as 
the respective coefficients estimated by the classic OLS regression. The fixed-effects 
estimation shows that the airline-specific effects account for 35.02% of the sample 
variation in the average airfare per mile. A comparison of the R-squared values 
indicates that the fixed-effects model provides a better goodness of fit than does the 
OLS model, which is not including carrier specific effects. It is further found that the 
coefficient for Route Market Share is, unexpectedly, negative in the estimation of the 
fixed-effects regression.  The high correlation between Route Market Share and 
Airport Market Share (see Table 7) likely contributes to this result8.   
Table II-7: Correlation among Market Structure Variables 
 Airport HHI Airport Market Share Route HHI Route Market Share 
Airport HHI 1.0000    
Airport Market Share 0.2334 1.0000   
Route HHI 0.3878 0.2074 1.0000  
Route Market Share 0.0918 0.7786 0.2349 1.0000 
 
In the estimation of the fixed-effects model, variance inflation factors (VIF) are 
computed to diagnose whether collinearity among some independent variables poses 
a serious concern for estimation reliability. We find that the values of VIF for all 
predictors are less than 10, indicating that multicollinearity is likely not a concern 
(Mason et al. 1991). 
 
                                                 
8 The alternative regression is also run for Model 1 after removing the variable, Route Market Share. 
The estimated coefficients for all other predicating variables are similar to the regression results in the 






The unit observation for the dependent variable in our estimation is average one-way 
airfare per mile for an individual airline on a given route.  In this situation the errors 
for the same carrier are likely to be correlated across routes, or irecov( , 0) ≠ite . 
Within-route errors are likely correlated between carriers as well, or 0),cov( ≠jrir ee . 
If either of these cases occurs, the i.i.d. assumption for the error term will be violated, 
and the variance-covariance matrix estimated by the fixed-effects model will be 
biased, thereby making the further inferences invalid. Therefore, it is important to 
examine whether the results based on the fixed-effects model are robust to alternative 
estimation procedures, such as a GLS random-effects model.  
 
The GLS random-effects model allows for stochastic regressors but relies upon the 
assumption of no correlation between predictors and the error term.  Its estimators are 
asymptotically unbiased and more efficient. Column 5 of Table 5 presents the results 
for the random-effects model. A Hausman specification test is performed to examine 
whether the coefficients estimated by the fixed-effects model are statistically different 
from those estimated by the GLS random-effects model. The resulting chi-square 
statistic is 4.28 with 8 degree of freedom, which is insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the two 
procedures are the same.  
 
Table 6 presents the results for Model 2, which examines whether the impact on firm 
collusive behavior is the same when multimarket contact occurs between firms with 




levels.  Two variations of the model are estimated.  From the fixed-effects estimation 
results, we find that the multimarket contact variables for carriers with similar costs 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Specifically, the positive 
coefficient for Multimarket Contact between high-cost and high-cost carriers 
indicates that the airfares for a high-cost carrier are higher on routes where it has 
more overlapping contacts with its high-cost rivals. Similarly, the positive coefficient 
for Multimarket Contact between low-cost and low-cost carriers suggests that airfares 
for a low-cost carrier are higher on routes where it has more overlapping markets with 
its low-cost counterparts. To see whether these two coefficients are statistically 
different, we run a restricted model where the two coefficients are constrained to be 
identical. The relevant F statistic comparing the unrestricted with the restricted 
regression is derived as F1, 4639 = 0.573, which is less than the critical value at the 5% 
level of significance. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient for multimarket contact between high-cost and high-cost carriers is the 
same as that for multimarket contact between low-cost and low-cost carriers. This 
result implies that multimarket contact between firms with similar cost levels has a 
positive effect on airfares, and it may not matter whether these rival firms are both 
high-cost, or both low-cost.  
 
In comparison, the coefficient for Multimarket contact between high-cost and low-
cost carrier is statistically insignificant. This finding supports our hypotheses that 
when multimarket contact is between carriers with dissimilar cost levels, there is no 




independent of multimarket contact; that is, multimarket contact does not facilitate 
tacit-colluding behavior. From Table 6, it is also found that the coefficient for Low-
Cost Rival is negative and statistically significant. This finding is in line with the 
widely-held view that the presence of low-cost rivals on a given route intensifies 
price competition, thereby pulling down airfares on the route. The estimation results 
for other variables, such as market structure, route distance, and airport slot-
controlled status, are similar to those found in Model 1.  
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This article theoretically and empirically investigates the differential impacts of  
multimarket contact on tacit-collusive behaviors for firms facing varying market 
characteristics, and for the rival pairs having similar/dissimilar production costs. The 
analytical results suggest that firms obtain more tacit collusion benefits when they 
compete simultaneously in multiple markets rather than in a single market. Therefore, 
multimarket contact facilitates tacit-colluding behavior and reduces the intensity of 
rivalry between multimarket competitors. A key contribution of our analytical study 
is to show that the collusion enhancing effects of multimarket contact hold true when 
markets are identical and firms produce outputs with identical marginal costs, which 
is constant throughout markets.  Under this condition, Bernheim and Whinston (1990) 
suggest that multimarket contact is irrelevant and does not facilitate collusion. Their 
findings are based upon an analytical model studying infinitely repeated Bertrand 
price competition between firms in the multimarket contact setting. In comparison, 
the conjectural variation model we develop focuses on explaining how multimarket 




Our analytical model demonstrates that multimarket contact is more effective in 
facilitating tacit collusive pricing when it occurs between rival firms having similar 
production costs than when it occurs between rival firms with dissimilar production 
costs. It is the formation of higher conjectural variation and the presence of greater 
product substitutability that reinforces the collusion-facilitating effects of multimarket 
contact for firms having similar production costs. This finding may have implications 
for firms competing across multiple markets. For example, when two firms compete 
in a local market with a single product, one option for a firm to avoid fierce 
competition is to distinguish itself from the rival firm by introducing differentiated 
products. The more dissimilar the products, the less likelihood for the occurrence of a 
pricing war. However, under a multimarket scenario, tacit collusion and lower rivalry 
intensity may be more likely to sustain when the product lines firms develop are 
similar to one another. Consequently, the competitive implications of a product 
differentiation strategy may be dramatically different for single market and 
multimarket contact settings.  
 
The empirical findings verify the propositions developed in our theoretical analysis. 
As expected, the estimation results support the longstanding view that multimarket 
contact reduces interfirm rivalry intensity. Using data from the U.S. airline market, 
we find that airfares are higher on routes where carriers have more overlapping 
contacts with rival carriers, ceteris paribus. Moreover, our estimations suggest that 




rival carriers have similar production costs; when rival carriers have dissimilar 
production costs, multimarket contact has little impact on a carrier’s yield.   
 
From this paper, it is found that low-cost carriers have positive reasons to engage in 
mutual forbearance when their rivals are also low-cost carriers. As a result, it may not 
be sufficient to just open airline markets to low-cost competition without any 
regulatory oversight. Since low-cost carriers appear to engage in tacit collusion, some 
regulatory oversight might still be needed. It is also important to realize that although 
multimarket contact enhances tacit collusive prices for both low-cost and high-cost 
carriers, it matters less as their products become more differentiated within and 
between markets.  




Chapter 3: Essay Two - A Two-Location Inventory Model with 
Transshipments in a Competitive Environment 
1. Introduction  
Due to the random nature of demand, stock discrepancies (i.e., the difference between 
the product amount available and the product amount demanded) are commonly 
observed in single-location and multiple-location distribution systems.  In a single-
location environment, this gap can be filled by having an amount of safety stock; i.e., 
by operating with a higher inventory level to protect against demand uncertainty.  
Compared with the single-location system, the multiple-location network has more 
alternatives to deal with demand uncertainty. Among these methods, the 
implementation of lateral transshipments among outlets is an effective and efficient 
way for firms to reduce inventory carrying cost and to improve customer service 
levels at the same time.  
 
Transshipments is a practice of transferring goods from one location with excess 
stock to satisfy demand at another location with insufficient stock (Dong and Rudi, 
2004). In many industries with long lead-times, short selling seasons, great demand 
uncertainty, high inventory carrying costs, and/or high penalty stockout costs, 
transshipments have been widely used to reallocate inventory from an overstocked 
outlet to an out-of-stock outlet. This practice is logically equivalent to other types of 
risk-pooling strategies, such as inventory centralization, postponed differentiation, 





The literature on modeling transshipments in a multi-location inventory system dates 
back to Krishnan and Rao (1965).  The distribution network they investigate has N 
warehouses, characterized by centralized control, independent demand, and identical 
inventory holding and shortage costs for all of the locations. Their analysis indicates 
that under these conditions, transshipments equalize optimal inventory and service 
levels among stocking locations. Krishnan and Rao (1965) present a fundamental 
framework to study the transshipment problem in several aspects. First, they identify 
a sequence of events with which transshipments are assumed to occur after the 
demand is realized, but before it is satisfied. Second, they set the transshipment size 
as the minimum of the excess stock at one location and the shortage at another 
location. When all locations are out of stock, or all have surplus stock, transshipments 
do not occur.  The third contribution of their analysis is that they take into account the 
fact that there is certain transshipment costs incurred when units are delivered from 
the overstocked location to the under-stocked location.  Within this framework, the 
practice of transshipments is modeled to enable the tradeoff between the total 
transshipment cost and the summation of inventory holding and shortage costs.  
 
Since then, there has been a growing body of work published on the topic of 
transshipments. Tagaras (1989), for example, generalizes the analysis developed by 
Krishnan and Rao (1965) and investigates the effect of transshipments on the 
customer service level, measured by both non-stockout probability and fill rate. 
Tagaras (1989) builds a two-location inventory distribution system, having two 




Krishnan and Rao (1965), Tagaras (1989) relaxes the constraints on cost structure by 
allowing for different ordering and holding costs at different locations. Tagaras 
(1989) also extends the findings by Krishnan and Rao (1965) and argues that a 
complete pooling policy9 improves the service levels at both locations, even if the two 
stocking locations have different inventory ordering and holding costs. A complete 
pooling policy is consistent with the transshipment policy specified by Krishnan and 
Rao (1989). Moreover, Tagaras (1989) finds that under certain conditions a complete 
pooling policy is optimal in that it achieves the minimum total expected cost in a two-
location distribution system, and it equalizes the service levels at both locations. 
However, such an equality of service levels for the cost minimization solution would 
hold only if the demand and cost structures are the same at the two locations.  
 
The approach of minimizing the total expected cost serves as the building block for 
the traditional newsvendor problem. A newsvendor must determine the order size of 
the newspaper before observing the actual demand for today’s paper.  If the order size 
is more than the actual demand, the newsvendor suffers a loss because the current 
issue has little salvage value in the future; on the other hand, if the order is less than 
the actual demand, the newsvendor bears a direct loss from the stock insufficiency for 
the current period, and an indirect loss because some of those dissatisfied customers 
will switch to other newsvendors in the future. For a known distribution over demand, 
the probabilities of stocking-out and over-stocking will depend on the inventory level 
                                                 
9 According to complete pooling policy, the number of units transshipped from one firm to another is 
the minimum of the excess stock at one location and the shortage at the other location. In addition, no 





chosen by the newsvendor.  Therefore, the optimal inventory level can be determined 
by minimizing the expected costs of stockouts and overstocks, given the cost 
structure as assumed.   
 
Many transshipment studies have applied and extended the classic newsvendor 
problem to a multi-newsvendor setting or a multi-period context. Of these studies, 
Robinson (1990) examines the optimal ordering policy (i.e., the order-up-to point) in 
a multi-period and multi-location system, allowing transshipments among retail 
outlets. Robinson (1990) demonstrates that as a recourse action, transshipping 
products among retail outlets is an alternative to retailers making orders at the 
beginning of each period, and thus has an effect on the choice of the order-up-to 
level.  By using a heuristic technique, Robinson (1990) verifies that if the base stock 
order-up-to point is nonnegative in the final period, it will be the optimal order-up-to 
level for all other periods, assuming that transshipments occur after demands are 
realized and before they are satisfied for each period. In Robinson’s model, the size of 
transshipments is consistent with the complete pooling policy; i.e., the amount of 
goods transshipped between a pair of outlets is just enough to meet the shortage at the 
outlet with insufficient stock, but not more than what is available at the surplus 
location after demands are realized.  
 
Most of these previous studies on transshipments follow the line that transshipments, 
as a mechanism to reallocate resources among locations at the same echelon level, 




sending outlet reduces its surplus inventory that otherwise would be less valuable, 
while the receiving outlet satisfies customers who might not be served otherwise. One 
limitation of these studies is that the two locations considered are independent, and 
isolated from each other. Because of this constraint, many interesting, dynamic, and 
strategic interactions between locations are ignored.  As Herer and Reshit (1999) 
point out, in a two-location inventory system allowing the implementation of 
transshipments, each location serves as a secondary, random source of supply to the 
other. Therefore, the employment of transshipments between locations must have a 
nontrivial impact on their replenishment decisions.  Herer and Reshit (1999) further 
demonstrate that in a two-location inventory system with nonnegligible fixed and 
joint replenishment costs, the traditional replenishment policy, i.e., the order-up-to-
point (s, S) at each location, is no longer optimal. Instead, coordination in inventory 
replenishment activities is necessary to leverage the benefits from transshipments.    
 
When inventory coordination and the implementation of transshipments are jointly 
considered, a central “parent” agent is assumed to help determine the order size and 
the transshipment quantity at each location (Rudi et al. 2001).  In reality, however, 
transshipments are also common in a decentralized environment, in which the 
inventory replenishment and transshipment decisions are made locally, rather than 
globally. The work by Rudi et al. (2001) addresses the transshipment problem in such 
a local decision-making context, in which each location aims to maximize its own 
profit. Their analysis demonstrates that joint profits would not be maximized in the 




an intermediate transshipment price makes it possible for each location to choose an 
order size, which would lead to the maximal joint profits. According to Rudi et al. 
(2001), the choices of order quantities at each location in a localized decision making 
environment are interrelated because of the externality effect arising from the 
transshipment practice. Specifically, when one location orders a large inventory, it 
becomes easier for other locations to rely on this inventory in case of stock outs; 
when one location makes a small-size order, it is easier for other locations to dispose 
of their surplus stock.    
 
Recently, the impact of transshipments on supplier performance has received growing 
attention. Dong and Rudi (2004), for instance, examine the effect of transshipments 
on manufacturer profits with two distinctive assumptions: (1) An exogenous 
wholesale price, which is the same regardless of whether transshipments occur or not; 
and (2) An endogenous wholesale price, which is set by the manufacturer as the best 
response to the optimal order quantities and the transshipment decisions made by 
retailers.  Moreover, Dong and Rudi (2004) investigate the role that the number of 
retailers, and the demand correlation among them, might play in affecting the 
relationship between the implementation of transshipments and the profits for 
manufacturers and retailers. They find that in the case of an exogenous wholesale 
price, the transshipment practice provides retailers with greater gains as the number 
of retailers increases, and as demand correlation among them decreases.  Both of 
these factors contribute to the risk-pooling effects.  In the case of an endogenous 




off.  Finally, their analytical results show that the benefit to the manufacturer from the 
implementation of transshipments is conditional upon the wholesale price in an 
endogenous price-setting situation. In other words, it is found that the manufacture 
can achieve more profits by charging a higher wholesale price.  Under such an 
exogenous wholesale price setting, the manufacturer is further found to benefit more 
from the transshipment practice when more retailers are participating and when their 
demands are less correlated.  
 
In the prior studies, the practice of transshipments among retailers is either voluntary 
or motivated by an appropriate transshipment price. One notable example is the study 
by Dong and Rudi (2004), in which a transshipment price is set by a Stackelberg 
game between the supplier and retailers. In their study, Dong and Rudi (2004) 
investigate a unique distribution system, in which a common manufacturer sells to n 
retailers that are owned or operated by the same entity. The optimal inventory level 
choice for each retailer is made to maximize the total expected profits of these 
retailers, on the condition of having an either exogeneous or endogenous wholesale 
price.  In an earlier work by Rudi et al. (2001), the authors consider the scenario 
where each location makes the order quantity decision to maximize its own profit, 
namely a local decision setting. They find that there exists a transshipment price that 
enables firms to achieve the same profit outcome in a local decision setting as that in 
a joint-decision setting, under which the order quantities are determined to maximize 
the joint profits of firms. These studies, however, assume away the possibility that 




reality, many retail outlets are head-to-head rivals. For example, when a customer 
cannot get a particular automobile at one dealer site, he/she might switch to a nearby 
dealer to make the purchase there.  Several questions remain in this situation: (1) Will 
transshipments occur when retailers are vying for the same pool of customers?  (2) 
Will transshipments always lead to win-win outcomes in such a competitive 
environment? and (3) Will there be a transshipment price that enables a large firm to 
achieve the same benefits from the practice of transshipments as does a small firm?  
 
In this essay, the transshipment problem is explored in a variety of competitive 
environments consisting of firms with symmetrical and asymmetrical market 
demands, and the comparisons are made in the performance effects of transshipments 
for firms operating in local and joint decision-making contexts.  The model is built 
upon the work by Krishnan and Rao (1965), Rudi et al. (2001), and Dong and Rudi 
(2004). The remainder of this essay is organized as follows.  The next section 
presents the basic modeling framework.  Section 3 analyzes the case where inventory 
decisions are made by two firms independently.  Section 4 examines the case where 
inventory choices are coordinated. Numerical examples are then used in Section 5 to 
illustrate these findings.  Section 6 offers conclusions and discusses limitation and 
future research.  
2. The Model 
The analysis of the classic newsvendor problem provides a useful framework to study 
transshipments among competing firms. In the traditional newsvendor problem 




newsvendor. The order quantity is determined to maximize the newsvendor’s 
expected profit, which is composed of the revenue from selling goods, the salvage 
value of the unsold stock, the penalty cost for the unmet demand, and the inventory 
purchasing cost. It has been found that for any type of monotonic, continuous demand 
distribution, there always exists a unique order quantity at which the expected 
marginal cost of adding another unit of order stock equals the expected marginal 
benefit.  The newsvendor’s expected profit is therefore maximized at this inventory 
level.  
 
The approach of modeling a single newsvendor problem has been extended to a two-
location environment.  In the context of two independent locations, the previous 
studies have presented a good illustration of how transshipments affect a firm’s 
inventory management. In reality, transshipments sometimes might occur between 
two firms that are coincidently competing with each other. In this setting, it is 
important to incorporate interfirm rivalry intensity into the analysis of the 
transshipment problem. Indeed, the nature of market competition can have a 
significant consequence on firm inventory decisions. Therefore, the conclusion drawn 
from previous models with respect to the implication of transshipments for 
performance outcomes would not hold in a competitive environment.  
 
Consider a distribution system consisting of two distributors and a common 




noted as i and j. At the beginning of a single order cycle, each firm decides a 
nonnegative inventory level Qi(j) before observing the actual demand Di(j). 
 
To capture the extent to which one firm is a direct or close competitor of the other, 
the model proposes the use of a customer’s switching rate (i.e., the probability of an 
individual consumer switching firms in the event of stockout). Formally, let ijλ stand 
for the switching rate from Firm i to j. It represents the probability of an individual 
customer switching to Firm j, when his/her demand at Firm i’s site cannot be satisfied 
because of insufficient stock. At an aggregate level, ijλ  indicates the percentage of 
customers switching to Firm j when the primary supplier, Firm i, is stocked out.  The 
more intense the competition between firms, the higher the switching rate. Further 
assume that the variable ijλ is exogenously given and can take any value between 0 
and 1.  
  
Table 1 presents the notation for a series of cost parameters that are used in the model. 
These parameters include the unit retailing price of Firms i and j, the manufacturing 
cost, the wholesale price, the average inventory carrying cost, the salvage value for 
each unsold unit, the penalty cost for each unment demand, the unit transshipment 
cost, and transshipment price. Table 1 also provides the notation for other relevant 
variables such as the level of transshipments, the amount of actual sales, unmet 





Table III-1: Notations for Key Parameters and Variables used in the Model 
Notation  Definition  
ip , jp  The unit price for goods sold by Firms i and j, respectively. 
m The unit manufacturing cost incurred by the supplier. 
iw , jw  The wholesale price paid by Firms i and j, respectively. 
j The average inventory carrying and holding costs. 
s The salvage value for each unsold stock. 
p The penalty cost for each unmet unit of demand. 
τ  The cost for transshipping a unit of goods from Firm i to j, and vice 
versa. 
ijc , jic  The transshipment price paid by Firm j to i, and by Firm i to j. 
ijX , jiX  The level of transshipments from Firm i to j, and from Firm j to i.  
iR , jR  The actual sale of Firm i, and j.  
iU , jU  The amount of unsold stock of Firm i, and j.  
iZ , jZ  The amount of unmet demand of Firm i, and j.  
ijλ , jiλ  The consumer’s switching rate from Firm i to j, and from Firm j to i.  
  
The model builds upon the sequence of events described as follows. At the beginning 
of the single replenishment period, shipments from the common supplier are ordered 
by Firms i and j to bring their stock levels to Qi and Qj. At some point in the period, 
all of the demands at both locations are realized and observed. Before this point in 
time, neither Firm i nor Firm j has complete knowledge of the actual demand for the 
current period. Then Firm i(j) compares the demand Di (j) with the stock level Qi (j). 
Four events may arise. In the first event, both firms have sufficient inventory to 
satisfy their demand, and thus all of the consumers are served instantly; in the second 
event, one firm, but not both, is out-of-stock, and the aggregate demand at the two 
locations exceeds the summed stock of Firms i and j; the third event specifies the 
situation similar to the previous one except that the joint inventory of the two 




event, both firms are stocked out, and, as a result, the satisfied demand at each 
location is up to the amount of stock that Firms i, and j, hold.  
 
The model further assumes that when one firm is out of stock while another firm has 
stock in redundancy, the firm having excess stock has two options to choose. Either it 
can transship its extra stock to the firm that is in short of supply, or it can sell to 
consumers switching from the out-of-stock firm. Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical 
illustrations of these two alternative scenarios. In Figure 1, transshipments are 
implemented between Firms i and j in the event of stock out and in this case, 
consumers will not switch but rather wait for the arrival of the transshipped goods. 
Figure 2 shows what happens when no transshipments are implemented. In this 
scenario, it is likely that consumers switch in the event of stock out.  
 
Figure III-1: An Illustration of the Scenario with Transshipments 
 










* Customers switch firms  












Since the model considers only one replenishment period, it is reasonable to assume 
that firms adopt the complete pooling policy. Suppose Firm i is out of stock, while 
Firm j has extra stock. According to this policy, all of the transshipments requests that 
Firm i makes to Firm j are honored if inventory at j’s location is available. In other 
words, Firm j will not transship more than it has available; on the other side, Firm i 
will not accept more than it requests. Moreover, no transshipments will occur if both 
locations are out of stock or if both have extra stock. 
 
Most previous studies have set the revenue per goods sold by the retailer as a constant 
r (e.g., Dong and Rudi 2004). In contrast, this model assumes that the unit price 
charged by Firms i and j may be different, denoted by ip  and jp , respectively.  The 
manufacturer produces to order with unit cost m and sells to Firm i(j) at the wholesale 
price wi(j). In addition to purchasing costs, each unit of inventory incurs carrying 
costs.  Let j be the average holding cost for each replenishment cycle, then the 
carrying costs associated with the inventory level Q can be written as jQ .   Further 
assume that the salvage value for each unsold unit is s, and the penalty cost for each 
unmet unit of demand is p.  For the goods transshipped from Firm i to j, Firm i is 
responsible for the delivery and thus bears a transshipment costτ , for each unit 
transshipped. In return, Firm j pays the transshipment price to Firm i, ijc  per unit 
transshipped.  
 
No short answer can be found for the questions of whether, when, and how much to 




provides a straightforward solution to this problem. Following this rule, the 
transshipments from Firm i to j are determined by 
]][,]min[[ ++ −−= jjiiij QDDQX , where [z]
+ = max [z, 0].  
In this expression, the notation +− ][ ii DQ represents the extra supply at location i and 
+− ][ jj QD is for the excess demand at location j.  According to the complete pooling 
rule, the transshipment size takes the lower value of the overstock at one location and 
the stock shortage at another.  Similarly, the level of transshipments from Firm j to i 
can be written as: ]][,]min[[ ++ −−= iijjji QDDQX .  
 
Adding the transshipments from Firm j, Firm i’s sales are the followings: 
jiiii XQDR += ),min( , and its unmet demand equals: 
+−−= )( jiiii XQDZ .  
Deducting the transshipments to Firm j, Firm i’s unsold stock is the followings: 
+−−= )( ijiii XDQU .  
 
Correspondingly, the following expressions hold for Firm j: 
ijjjj XQDR += ),min( ,  
+−−= )( jijjj XDQU , and 
+−−= )( ijjjj XQDZ .  
With transshipments, the expected profits for Firms i and j can be written as:  
iiiiijiijijjiiijiijjii jQQwpZsUXcXcRpEccQQ −−−+−−+= ])([),,,( τπ      (2.1) 
jjjjjijjijiijjjjiijjij jQQwpZsUXcXcRpEccQQ −−−+−−+= ])([),,,( τπ   (2.2) 
The profit for the supplier is a function of order quantities made by Firms i and j, 





s QmwQmw )()( −+−=π     (2.3) 
 
To see the role that transshipments play in reallocating resources and thus affecting a 
prior inventory decisions, it is necessary to draw a comparison between the cases with 
and without transshipments. Consider a setting when Firm i is overstocked by (Qi – 
Di), whereas Firm j is out of stock by (Dj – Qj).  Assume no transshipments are 
implemented from Firm i to j.  Firm j would end with (Dj – Qj) unmet demand and of 
those dissatisfied customers, )( jjji QD −λ would switch to Firm i. The demand at Firm 
i’s site would therefore increase to )( jjjii QDD −+ λ provided sufficient stock is 
available to serve consumers switching from Firm j.  Alternatively, Firm i can 
transship part or all of its extra stock to Firm j. 
 
Although transshipments, viewed as an inventory pooling practice, have been studied 
mostly from the retailer’s perspective, it is important to see how the supplier fares as 
well. Indeed, Rudi et al. (2001) suggest that an important extension of the 
transshipment study in the future is to incorporate the manufacturer into the analysis. 
A follow-up question arises as to how to align the supplier’s interest with the 
retailers’ concerns or profitability. For example, if the supplier designs a constant 
wholesale price, its profit grows invariably with the order quantities from retailers. 
The more goods retailers order, the more profits the supplier gains. However, a large-
size order is inevitably accompanied by high inventory-carrying costs for retailer, 
resulting in potential losses during periods of low demand. Therefore, a large-size 




prefer small order sizes when transshipments provide them with the opportunity to 
replenish their stock, incurring costs no greater than those related to lost sales or 
backorders. The above discussion ignores the key role of the transshipment price in 
realigning retailer inventory decisions with supplier profitability. In fact, the joint 
order quantities of retailers change nonlinearly with the transshipment price. 
Therefore, it is in the supplier’s interest to coordinate the retailer inventory decisions 
through the use of transshipment price.  Moreover, if it is found that a small retailer 
benefits more through transshipments than its large rival counterpart, some additional 
incentive mechanisms might be necessary in order for the large firm to participate in 
the practice of transshipments with the small firm.  
 
Previous studies of the transshipment problem have established a number of 
constraints on cost parameters. These assumptions are used to ensure that the results 
are nontrivial and feasible (Tagaras 1989, Robinson 1990, and Dong and Rudi 2004). 
Following their approach, the cost parameters in the model are restricted by the 
conditions below.  
(1 ) jwsjws ji +<+< ,        
(2) ppjw ii +<+ , ppjw jj +<+     
(3) iwm < , jwm <        
(4) ppjs i +<++τ , ppjs j +<++τ     
(5) ],[ ppsc iij ++∈ τ , ],[ ppsc jji ++∈ τ    
Conditions (1) and (2) together exclude two extreme possibilities: Firms ordering an 




greater than the summation of the unit wholesale price and the inventory carrying 
cost, firms can always recover the cost of adding additional stock, no matter whether 
it is sold or not. On the other hand, when the cost of ordering additional stock is 
greater than the summation of the unit price and the penalty cost; i.e., the marginal 
value per unit sold, firms have no willingness to distribute the product. 
  
For the manufacturer or the common supplier to participate in the system, it is 
necessary that the unit manufacturing cost be less than the wholesale price, as shown 
in Condition (3).  The inequality in Condition (4) suggests that transshipments, in 
general, are beneficial because the salvage value of the unit stock at one location, if 
not transshipped, is less than the revenue from selling it to another location, minus the 
cost incurred in transshipping and holding the good.  
 
Condition (5) provides a feasible range for the transshipment price. The lower bound 
of this range is the total of the salvage value, and the transshipment cost, per unit 
good. It can be viewed as a reservation price for the firm sending the transshipped 
goods. From the sender’s perspective, it will not transship the goods to another 
location unless it gets a payment exceeding such a reservation price. The upper bound 
of this range represents the marginal value of an additional sale, which is the 
summation of the unit market price and the penalty cost per lost sale.  Similarly, it can 
be viewed as a reservation price for the firm accepting the transshipped goods. On the 
recipient’s side, it will accept the transshipped goods only if the transshipment price it 




restricted within this range can satisfy both the sender and the recipient (Note: cij 
represents the transshipment price paid by Firm i to j, and cji is the other way). 
 
Although the following sections focus on studying expected profits for firms and their 
inventory decisions in a stochastic demand environment, it is necessary to describe 
the occurrence of transshipments in each of various scenarios, as presented in Figure 
3.                             














In this graph, Di, Dj represent the demand size at Firm i’s and Firm j’s locations, 
respectively.  Qi and Qj are the order quantities that Firms i and j replenish at the 
beginning of the order cycle. In a single-period planning horizon, six scenarios can 
arise. Event I represents the scenario where Firms i and j are both out of stock. Event 
IV, on the contrary, is the scenario where Firms i and j are both overstocked.  
Intuitively, these two events involve no transshipments. Of particular interest are the 














In Event II, Firm j has demand Dj that is more than its inventory stock Qj, while Firm 
i has demand Di that is less than its inventory stock Qi. In other words, Firm i has 
surplus stock (Qi - Di), and Firm j is out of stock by (Dj – Qj). Therefore, a 
transshipment is directed from Firm i to j.  Similarly, in Event III, Firm j is stocked 
out, whereas Firm i is overstocked; thus Firm i transships its extra stock to Firm j. 
Although the directions of transshipments in Events II and III are the same, the 
quantities transshipped are different. A close look at the graph shows that in Event II, 
the total demand for Firms i and j, denoted as (Di + Dj), is greater than their aggregate 
stock (Qi+Qj). This implies that the surplus stock at Firm i’s location (Qi – Di) is not 
sufficient to fill the stock shortage of Firm j, denoted by (Dj – Qj).  Therefore, the 
maximum quantity transshipped is (Qi-Di).  
 
In Event III, however, the aggregate stock of Firms i and j is more than the joint 
demand at two locations. The system-wide inventory abundance implies that the short 
position at Firm j’s location can be fulfilled with the transshipment from Firm i.  In 
this case, the transshipment quantity is (Dj- Qj).  
 
Figure 3 also shows that Event VI is a situation parallel to Event II. The 
transshipment directions are opposite in these two events. Nevertheless, the two 
events result in the same amount of unmet demand (Di + Dj – Qi – Qj). Similarly, 
Event V and Event III are counterparts in that these two scenarios end with the 




3. Transshipments in a Competitive Decision-Making Environment 
In the competitive decision-making environment, each firm chooses its inventory 
level to maximize its own expected profit. The analysis is first conducted in the 
scenario where no transshipments are implemented between two competing firms, 
and then in the scenario where the complete pooling policy is employed to initiate 
transshipments between firms.  
3.1 Optimal Inventory Decision without Transshipments 
Suppose two firms are independent of each other, and the surplus stock at one firm’s 
site is not allowed to transship to the coincidentally out-of-stock location. The 
expected profits for Firms i and j can be written as 
iiiiiiijii jQQwpZsURpEQQ −−−+= ][),(π    (3.1.1) 
jjjjjjjjij jQQwpZsURpEQQ −−−+= ][),(π    (3.1.2) 
For each firm, its expected profit includes the expected revenue from sales, revenue 
from the salvage value for unsold stock, the expected penalty cost for the unmet 
demand, and the inventory purchasing and holding costs. To simplify the analysis, 
some cost parameters, such as the unit salvage value, the unit penalty cost, and the 
average inventory carrying cost, are assumed to be the same for both firms; others are 
unique for each firm, e.g., the retail price and the wholesale price. Tables 2 and 3 
display the amount of sales (R), unmet demand (U), and unsold stock (Z) for Firms i 






Table III-2: Key Values for Events I, II, and III 























Ri Qi )( jjjii QDD −+ λ  )( jjjii QDD −+ λ  
Rj Qj Qj Qj 
Ui 0 )( jjjiii QDDQ −−− λ 0 )( jjjiii QDDQ −−− λ  
Uj 0 0 0 
Zi Di - Qi 0 0 0 
Zj Dj - Qj Dj - Qj Dj - Qj 
 
Table III-3: Key Values for Events IV, V, and VI 























Ri Di Qi Qi 
Rj Dj )( iiijj QDD −+ λ  )( iiijj QDD −+ λ  
Ui Qi - Di 0 0 
Uj Qj - Dj )( iiijjj QDDQ −−− λ  )( iiijjj QDDQ −−− λ  0 
Zi 0 Di - Qi Di - Qi 
Zj 0 0 0 0 
 
In Tables 2 and 3, jiλ and jiλ denote the percent of unsatisfied consumers switching 
from Firm j to i, and from Firm i to j, respectively.  The value of the switching rate 
represents the degree of competition between firms. When two firms are close rivals, 
the switching rate from one to the other is expected to be higher. Consumer switching 
behavior can be explained by several factors, such as product substitutability, 
consumer loyalty, price difference, geographical distance between firms, and so on. 
In the following analysis, the switching rate is assumed to be an exogenously given 




To see how the values for R, U, and Z are determined, take Event II as an example. In 
this case, Firm i has (Qi – Di) stock left after satisfying its own consumers (Di); Firm 
j, in contrast, cannot sell more than its own stock (Qj) without getting transshipments 
from Firm i. Of those unserved consumers at j’s location, )( jjji QD −λ switch to Firm 
i. Therefore, the units sold at Firm i’s location equals )( jjjii QDD −+ λ , while the 
sales by Firm j are jQ . Further, for a relatively low switching rate jiλ , Firm i still has 
unsold stock of )( jjjiii QDDQ −−− λ  even after satisfying all the switching 







, the extra stock left after Firm i sells products to its own market is not 
sufficient to satisfy all the switching consumers from Firm j. Nevertheless, those 
unsatisfied switching consumers will not incur penalty costs for Firm i, and thus the 
unmet demand at Firm i’s location can be identified as zero.   
 
The optimal inventory levels for Firms i and j are derived by solving the expected 
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        = )()([)](1)(( jjijijjjjj QDDQQProbQDProbsQDProbpp <<−+−<+<−+  
         jwQDQDProbQDDQQProb jjjiiijjjiji −−<+−<<−++ )])(()( λ       (3.1.4) 
Equation (3.1.3) shows the marginal expected profitability of increasing the inventory 
level for Firm i. The right hand side of (3.1.3) consists of three parts. First, the value 
( ppi + ), or the summation of the retail price and the penalty cost, corresponds to the 
marginal benefit of adding an additional unit in stock when the demand happens to be 
greater than the stock level, denoted by )( ii QDProb > . Second, when the actual 
demand falls short of the inventory stock (i.e., in Events II, III, and IV), additional 
stock contributes to the revenue; increasing the unsold stock allows Firm i to obtain 








an additional unit in stock will be accompanied by an increase in the unsold stock, 
which in turn results in the fulfillment of the salvage value s. Finally, the value 
jwi +  is the cost for acquiring and carrying an additional inventory unit. Similarly, 
Equation (3.1.4) gives the marginal expected profitability of increasing the inventory 
level for Firm j.  
 
Table 4 provides a list of shorthand variables that can be used to simplify Equations 
(3.1.3) and (3.1.4). Suppose the demand for each firm, Di and Dj, has continuous 
distribution, then the probability functions denoted as )( jiα , )( jiβ , )( jiγ  and )( jiy are 





Table III-4: Variable Notations and Definitions 
Notation Variable Description 
)( ii Qα  )(Pr ii QDob <  The probability for Firm i to be overstocked   
),( jii QQγ  )(Pr iijji QDDQQob <<−+  The probability in the occurrence of Event II 
),,( jijii QQy λ  ))((Pr jjjiii QDQDob −−< λ  
The probability for Firm i to have leftover stock 
after selling to switching consumers from Firm j 
),( jii QQβ  )(Pr jjiii DQQDQob −+<<  The probability in the occurrence of Event V 
)( jj Qα  )(Pr jj QDob <  The probability for Firm j to be overstocked 
),( jij QQγ  )(Pr jjiji QDDQQob <<−+  The Probability in the occurrence of Event VI 
),,( ijjij QQy λ  ))((Pr iiijjj QDQDob −−< λ  
The probability for Firm j to have leftover stock 
after selling to switching consumers from Firm i 
),( jij QQβ  )(Pr ijijj DQQDQob −+<<  The probability in the occurrence of Event III 
 
















     
                 (3.1.6) 
Next, the optimal inventory level for Firm i, *iQ , can be derived by solving the 






, assuming Firm j’s inventory level jQ as given. Similarly, the 







, given Firm i’s inventory choice iQ .  The conditions characterizing optimal 
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            (3.1.8) 
Rearrange Equation (3.1.7). The condition characterizing the optimal inventory for 





















= λγγα  
(3.1.7′) 
Given a continuous distribution over the demand, the value for iQ  increases 
with )( ii Qα , which represents the probability of the demand iD  being less than the 
inventory level iQ . Therefore, as the value for the right-hand side of Equation (3.1.7′) 
increases, the optimal inventory level goes up. From the above discussion, 
Propositions 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are stated as follows.  
 
Proposition 3.1.1:  
Without transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is increasing with the 
salvage value, holding the summation of the retail price and the stockout cost 
constant, for a continuous demand distribution.  
 
Proposition 3.1.2:  
Without transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is decreasing with the 
wholesale price and the inventory carrying cost, holding other cost parameters 





Proposition 3.1.3:  
Without transshipments, there exists a static Nash equilibrium ),( ** ji QQ for two 
competing Firms i, and j, in the inventory-decision game; Firm i’s optimal inventory 
level decreases with j’s optimal inventory, for sppi >+ .  
Proof:  
According to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), a unique Nash equilibrium exists if the 
reaction function is monotonic, and its absolute slope value is less than 1.  Therefore, to 
prove Proposition 3.1.3, it is sufficient to show that the reaction function ji QQ ∂∂ /  
satisfies the monotonic and less-than-one slope value requirements. Transform Equation 
(3.1.7) to the function ),,( jiji QQF λ , as shown in (3.1.9). By taking the implicit 
differentiation of Equation (3.1.9) with respect to iQ , and jQ , the expression for 
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                                                                           (3.1.9) 
For the continuous and differentiable functions )( ii Qα , ),( jii QQγ , and ),,( jijii QQy λ , 
use the following symbols to represent the relevant marginal probabilities, in which ft 
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−= γ  (3.1.11) 




















    (3.1.12) 
It can be shown that the absolute value for the right-hand-side of Equation (3.1.12) is 










3.2 Optimal Inventory Decision with Transshipments 
This section first examines the inventory level each firm chooses in order to 
maximize its own expected profit after allowing for the implementation of 
transshipments. The optimal inventory level is then compared with the results drawn 
from Section 3.1 (i.e., the inventory choice in the setting of no transshipments). When 
the practice of transshipments is incorporated into the analysis, the expected profits 
for Firms i and j have the following expressions.  
iiiiijiijijjiiijiijjii jQQwpZsUXcXcRpEccQQ −−−+−−+= ])([),,,( τπ      (3.2.1) 
jjjjjijjijiijjjjiijjij jQQwpZsUXcXcRpEccQQ −−−+−−+= ])([),,,( τπ  (3.2.2) 
Consider Firm i’s expected profit. The revenue side has three parts: the expected sales to 
meet its demand, the expected revenue from transshipping its extra stock to Firm j, and the 
expected salvage value for unsold items; the expected costs include: the transportation cost 
involved to make transshipments to Firm j, the payment to Firm j for receiving its 
transshipped items, the penalty cost for lost sales, and the inventory purchasing and 
carrying costs. Table 5 shows the amount of transshipments (X), sales (R), unmet demand 
(U), and unsold stock (U) for Firms i and j in each of the six Events from I to VI.  
Table III-5: Events and Associated Key Values 













Xji 0 0 0 0 Di - Qi Qj - Dj 
Xij 0 Qi – Di Dj - Qj 0 0 0 
Ri Qi Di Di Di Di Qi + Qj - Dj 
Rj Qj Qi + Qj -Di Dj Dj Dj Dj 
Ui 0 0 Qi+Qj –Di-Dj Qi – Di 0 0 
Uj 0 0 0 Qj-Dj Qi + Qj –Di-Dj 0 
Zi Di-Qi 0 0 0 0 Di+Dj-Qi-Qj 





Event II, again, is used as an example to show how these values are determined. In 
this example, Firm i has surplus stock (Qi – Di) available to transship to Firm j, whose 
inventory stock (Qj) is not sufficient to satisfy all its demand (Dj). Moreover, the 
amount of the surplus stock at Firm i’s location is less than Firm j’s shortage. 
According to the complete pooling policy, the size of the transshipment from Firm i 
to j, Xij, is (Qi – Di). Therefore, sales by Firm i, Ri, are Di and sales by Firm j, Rj, are 
equal to (Qj +(Qi – Di)). With the transshipment, Xij, Firm i consumes all of its extra 
inventory and thus the unsold stock, Ui, is zero; Firm j, however, still has unmet 
demand of (Dj + Di – Qi -Qj), denoted by Zj.  
 
Take the derivative of the expected profit in (3.2.1) and (3.2.2), with respect to Qi, 
and Qj, respectively. The results are shown in (3.2.3) and (3.2.6).  




∂ τπ    
          + jwVIIProbp i −−∪ )(        
           = jijijjiiiiii QQProbcDQQDQProbQDProbpp +−+−+<<−<−+ ()()]()(1)[( τ                     
           jiiijjiiiijiij QQProbQDProbsDQQDQProbcQDD +−<+−+<<+<<− ()([)()  
       jwQDD iiij −−<<− )                                        (3.2.3) 
Equation (3.2.3) presents the marginal expected profitability of increasing the 
inventory level for Firm i. The right hand side of (3.2.3) has five parts. First, the value 
of )( ppi + represents the marginal benefit of increasing the inventory level when 
transshipments from Firm j are impossible or not sufficient to fill the oversized 




all of its surplus stock to Firm j. As such, each additional inventory unit increases 
Firm i’s revenue by the transshipment price minus the transportation cost (as denoted 
by τ−jic ). Third, an additional unit in stock can save Firm i the transshipment price, 
cij, which otherwise would be paid to Firm j when Event V occurs.  Fourth, when 
either Events III or IV occurs, raising Firm i’s inventory level only leads to an 
increase in unsold items, and thus contributes to the bottom line with the salvage 
value, s. Lastly, the marginal cost of increasing inventory stock equals the summation 
of the purchasing and carrying cost (as denoted by jwi + ).  
 










            jwQQ ijii −−− )),(γ                     (3.2.4) 








, given Firm j’s inventory choice of jQ . At the optimal inventory 


























γβα     (3.2.5) 
Similarly, for Firm j, the marginal expected profitability of increasing the inventory 












jiijijijjjjj QQobcDQQDQobQDobpp +−+−+<<−<−+= (Pr)()](Pr)(Pr1)[( τ
jijjijijjjijji QQobQDobsDQQDQobcQDD +−<+−+<<+<<− (Pr)([Pr)(Pr)
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 = ),(),()()),()(1)(( jijjijijijjijjjj QQcQQcQQQpp βγτβα +−+−−+  
    jwQQQs jjijjj −−−+ )),()(( γα             (3.2.6) 


































Rearrange Equations (3.2.5), and (3.2.7). The conditions characterizing the optimal 


























































γβα       (3.2.7′) 
For a continuous demand distribution, the optimal inventory level *iQ increases with the 
value for the right-hand side of Equation (3.2.5′).  Accordingly, Propositions 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2 always hold.   
 
Proposition 3.2.1:  
With transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is increasing with the salvage 
value, holding the summation of the retail price and the stockout cost constant, for a 




decreasing with the wholesale price and the inventory carrying cost, holding other cost 
parameters constant, for a continuous demand distribution.  
  
Proposition 3.2.2:  
With transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is increasing with the 
transshipment price, when the transshipment price ppc iij +<  and τ+> sc ji .  
 
It is a commonly accepted assumption that the summation of the retail price and the 
penalty cost is greater than the salvage value. According to Proposition 3.2.2, Firm i 
chooses to have more inventory when the transshipment price it pays to the sender 
becomes greater; on the other side, Firm i chooses to have more inventory when the 
transshipment price paid by the recipient becomes greater.  By comparing Equation 
(3.2.5′) with (3.1.7′),  it is found that the key determinants for the optimal inventory level 
without transshipments include the salvage value and the switching rate; when 
transshipments are implemented, the optimal inventory choice is determined mainly by 
other factors, such as transshipment price and transshipment cost.    
 
Proposition 3.2.3:  
With transshipments, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium ),( ** ji QQ for two 
competing Firms i, and j, in the inventory-decision game; Firm i’s optimal inventory 
level decreases with j’s optimal inventory, when the transshipment price 





The proof for Proposition 3.2.3 is similar to that for Proposition 3.1.3. By checking the 
sign and the slope value for ji QQ ∂∂ / , as indicated in (3.2.11), the existence of the 
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It can be shown that the absolute value for the right-hand-side of Equation (3.2.11) is 





4. Transshipments in a Cooperative Decision-Making Environment 
In a cooperative decision-making environment, the optimal inventory level at each 
firm’s location is determined by maximizing the joint profits of the two firms. This 
scenario has been studied by Robinson (1990), and Rudi et al. (2001). The analysis 
developed in this section differs from previous research in two aspects. First, the 
model takes into account the fact that consumers switch firms in case of stockout 
when transshipments are not implemented between firms. Second, the model 
investigates and compares the inventory decisions and profit outcomes of firms that 
are implementing transshipments in two different cooperative mechanisms.   
 
In the first setting, the inventory level at each location is optimized to maximize the 
aggregate expected profits of the two firms. For each firm, its expected profit is based 
on the demand forecast of the local market. This case has been studied by Rudi et al. 
(2001). The second cooperative scenario modeled in this section differs from previous 
research (e.g., Rudi et al. 2001) in that the aggregate profits of the two firms are 
determined by the total demand forecasts in the markets of the two firms. In this case, 
the two firms determine their joint order quantities based on the aggregate market 
demand forecasts and then allocate the total inventory according to the respective 
local market demands. In both cases, the practice of transshipments can be viewed as 
an intra-firm reallocation of inventories and it allows firms to reduce inventory 
investments without lowering customer service level.  The analysis in this section 
provides a framework to examine whether the practice of order coordination enhances 




The rest of this section is organized as follows. Section 4.1 investigates the scenario 
where no transshipments are implemented between two cooperative firms. Consistent 
to the approach used by Rudi et al. (2001), the inventory levels are optimized to 
maximize the joint profits of the two firms. As discussed in the preceding section, the 
“without transshipments” cooperative scenario is distinct from the one studied by 
Rudi et al. (2001) in that it takes the likelihood of consumers’ switching between 
firms into consideration when stockout occurs at one but not both locations. Section 
4.2 investigates two cooperative scenarios when transshipments are implemented 
between firms. In Section 4.2.1, the optimal inventory level at each location is 
determined by maximizing the summation of the expected profits of the two firms. 
The expected profit for each firm is based on the anticipated demand in the local 
market.  In comparison, Section 4.2.2 makes a further assumption that the two firms 
coordinate their inventory decisions so that aggregate profits of the two firms are 
maximized basing on their joint demand forecasts. In this section, firms first make 
their joint order quantity decision and then allocate the optimal inventory. Since such 
a practice of order coordination enables firms to pool the demands at the local market, 
it is expected to find that firms will achieve greater profits in the scenario modeled by 
Section 4.2.2, as compared to in the previously studied scenario, in which firms 
simply share their inventories through the employment of transshipments. 
4.1 Optimal Inventory Decision without Transshipments 
In Expression (4.1.1),  ),( ji
J QQπ  is the joint expected profit for Firms i and j, in the case 
when no transshipments are implemented. Without transshipments, some of the consumers 




while i is overstocked.   The size of the switching consumer group is determined by the 
value of the switching rate, and the number of unserved consumers. Tables 6 and 7 list the 
number of units sold by each firm, the total number of unsold stock units, and unmet 
demand for Firms i and j, that are associated with each of the six events.  
jjjiiijijijjiiji
J jQQwjQQwpZpZsUsURpRpEQQ −−−−−−+++= ][),(π    (4.1.1) 
Table III-6: Key Values for Events I, II, and III 
























Ri Qi )( jjjii QDD −+ λ  )( jjjii QDD −+ λ  
Rj Qj Qj Qj 
Ui + Uj 0 )( jjjiii QDDQ −−− λ 0 )( jjjiii QDDQ −−− λ  
Zi + Zj Di + Dj - Qi - Qj Dj - Qj Dj - Qj 
 
Table III-7: Key Values for Events IV, V, and VI 























Ri Di Qi Qi 
Rj Dj )( iiijj QDD −+ λ  )( iiijj QDD −+ λ  
Ui + Uj Qi + Qj - Di - Dj )( iiijjj QDDQ −−− λ  )( iiijjj QDDQ −−− λ  0 
Zi + Zj 0 Di - Qi Di - Qi 
 
Then the optimal inventories for Firm i and Firm j are derived from solving the joint 
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π . Using the notation in Table 4, the solution for the 














































































Rearrange (4.1.6) and (4.1.7), and the amount for the optimal stock iQ  , and jQ can be 




















































































Proposition 4.1.1:  
Without transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is decreasing with the 
switching rate, ijλ , when the retail price charged by its rival firm is greater than the 









Proposition 4.1.2:  
Without transshipments, Firm j’s optimal inventory level is decreasing with the 
switching rate, jiλ , when the retailer price charged by its rival firm is greater than the 
salvage value.  
4.2 Optimal Inventory Decision with Transshipments 
4.2.1 Joint Decision-Making without Order Coordination 
This section examines the case where the inventory level decisions are made by two 
firms individually to maximize their joint expected profit. The expected profit for 
each firm is determined by the demand distribution in the local market.  The joint 
expected profit, ),( ji
JTI QQπ , is expressed by (4.2.1), in which ijji XX +  represents 
the total number of units transshipped between Firms i and j, and τ  is the unit 
transshipment cost. In this model, the order stock levels iQ , and jQ , are optimized to 
maximize the joint expected profits for Firms i and j. Therefore, the transshipment 
payment made between firms is cancelled out in (4.2.1).  
jjjiiijijiijjijjiiji
JTI jQQwjQQwZZpUUsXXRpRpEQQ −−−−+−+++−+= )]()()([),( τπ
                 (4.2.1) 
Table III-8: Events and Associated Key Values 













Xji+Xij 0 Qi – Di Dj - Qj 0 Di - Qi Qj - Dj 
Ri +Rj Qi + Qj Qi + Qj  Di + Dj Di +Dj Di + Dj Qi + Qj 
Ui +Uj  0 0 Qi + Qj –Di-Dj Qi + Qj 
– Di -Dj 
Qi + Qj –Di-Dj 0 
Zi +Zj Di+ Dj  
-Qi-Qj 





Table 8 shows that for each of the six events, the total number of units sold by Firms 
i, and j, the total number of units transshipped between Firms i and j, the aggregate 
unsold stocks and unmet demands of the two firms.  Their optimal stock levels are 







jijjjiiiiii QQProbppDQQDQProbQDProbpp ++−+−+<<−<−+= ()()]()(1)[( τ
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           )([)()() jjijijjjjij QDProbsDQQDQProbsQDDQ <+−+<<++<<−+ τ            
            jwQDDQQProb jjjiji −−<<−+− )](                (4.2.3) 
 
By using the notation in Table 4, the above optimization problem is simplified as 





































































Therefore, the optimal stock levels when Firms i and j implement transshipments in a 


































































βα    
(4.2.5′) 
Propositions 4.2.1:  
With transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is decreasing with 
transshipment cost, holding other cost parameters constant, for a continuous demand 
distribution.  
 
Proposition 4.2.2:  
With transshipments, Firm i’s optimal inventory level is decreasing with the product 
price in its own market relative to the product price in Firm j’s market, for a 
continuous demand distribution.  
 
Finally, the solution for the optimal ),( ji QQ is unique, proved as follows.  
),()(),()()()(),( jiijjiiiiiiji QQsppQQsppQsppQQF γτβτα −−+−−−++−+=  
                     )( jwpp ii −−+−                                 (4.2.6) 
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4.2.2 Joint Decision-Making with Order Coordination 
This section examines an alternative cooperative decision making scenario, in which 
the joint inventory for the two firms is optimized to maximize their total expected 
profits that are determined by the aggregate market demands. Then the two firms 
allocate the joint inventory. The order quantity assigned to an individual firm is 
commensurate with its market demand. To simplify the analysis, we make a further 
assumption that Firm i and j have identical retailing price (i.e., rpp ji == ).  The 
joint inventory level of Firm i and j is denoted as Q (i.e., )ji QQQ += , and their 
aggregate demand is represented by D (i.e., )ji DDD += .  In Expression (4.2.10), the 
joint profits for Firms i and j are composed of five parts: The revenue from selling R 
units of goods, the salvage value associated with U units of unsold stock, the costs of 
transshipping jiij XX + amount of goods, the penalty cost of having Z units of unmet 
demand (i.e., )ji ZZZ += , and the costs of purchasing and carrying Q (i.e., 
)ji QQQ += units of inventory.  
QjwpZXXsUrRE jiij
JTII




Table 9 presents the values for R, U, Z, and jiij XX + that are associated with each of 
the six events. Of these variables, the number of goods transshipped from one firm to 
another is determined by the quantities of stock assigned to Firms i and j, and the 
actual demand realized in the markets of the two firms. The model further assumes 
that the allocation is based on the market demand one firm has relative to another. 
Let
n
QQi = , and Qn
nQj )









1 .  According to this allocation rule, the stock levels allocated 












To illustrate this rule, consider a special example where the two firms have identical 
demand distribution. In this case, the value for n equals to 2, and Firms i and j each 
has an inventory level of Q/2.  
Table III-9: Events and Associated Key Values 
 I II III IV V VI 












R Q Q D D D Q 
U 0 0 Q - D Q - D Q – D 0 
Z D - Q D - Q 0 0 0 D - Q 
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Given the values provided in Table 9, the optimal aggregate stock level is derived by 
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Table III-10: Notations for Key Parameters 
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(4.2.12) 
Therefore, the optimal joint inventory level for Firms i and j is determined by solving 
































             (4.2.13) 
In the previous section, the optimal inventory level for Firm i and j are jointly 
determined by solving Equations (4.2.4′) = 0 and (4.2.5′) = 0. In comparison, the 
optimal total inventory in the Scenario II is determined by solving Equation (4.2.13) 
= 0. It would be interesting to examine whether the inventory level decisions that 
Firms i and j make in these two scenarios are identical, and whether these two 
scenarios leads to an equivalent profit outcome. If not, then a follow-up question is: 
Of these two cooperative settings, which scenario is more efficient and provides 




Now consider a special case, in which Firms i and j are assumed to face identical 
demand distribution, and the values for other parameters are symmetrical.  In this 
case, Firms i and j evenly share the optimal total inventory. In other words, the 
following conditions hold: n = 2, )()( QQ ji γγ = , and )()( QQ ji ββ = . Hence, 













=                               (4.2.14)  
The optimal joint inventory Q* is determined by solving (4.2.14) = 0, and for each 
firm, its optimal inventory equals to Q*/2.  To illustrate these analytical results, 
several numerical examples are developed in the following section.  
5. Numerical Examples 
In this section, a series of numerical examples are used to illustrate the analytical 
results. In Example 1, Firm i and Firm j are assumed to face an identical uniform 
demand distribution within [0, 200].  In the second example, Firms i and j have 
asymmetrical demands; the demand for Firm i is uniformly distributed between [0, 
200], and the demand for Firm j is uniformly distributed between [0, 300]. In Example 
3, the difference in the mean demand for these two hypothetical firms becomes larger; 
Firm j has its demand distributed within [0, 400] and the demand for Firm i remains 
within [0, 200]. In all of these examples, the values for relevant cost parameters are 






Table III-11: Assumed Values for Relevant Cost Parameters 
Cost Parameters  Notation  Assumed Value  
Wholesale price  iw , jw   20 
Retail price ip , jp   40 
Salvage value s   10 
Penalty cost p    8 
Inventory carrying cost j    4 
Transshipment cost  τ    2 
Transshipment price ijc , jic   [0, 48] 
Switching rate ijλ ,  jiλ   [0, 1] 
5.1 Results for Example 1 
In this section, the analysis is drawn from Example 1, in which Firms i and j are 
assumed to have identical, uniformly distributed demands within [0, 200].  
 
5.1.1 Results for the Scenario with Transshipments 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the optimal inventory level and the value of 
the switching rate when no transshipments are implemented between the two firms. In 
the competitive setting, each firm’s optimal stock is invariant with the switching rate, 
as shown by the flat line in Figure 4. In our examples, the switching rate values are 
assumed to be symmetrical for Firms i and j. For each firm, therefore, the potential 
loss of consumers to its competitor is counteracted by the same number of consumers 
diverting from the rival firm, as the two firms are assumed to have identical demand 
distribution. In such a symmetrical scenario, the competitive intensity between rival 





By contrast, the optimal stock level decreases with the switching rate in the 
cooperative setting, as shown in Figure 4. Without transshipments, consumers divert 
away from one firm to another, thereby providing two cooperating firms with 
opportunities to share their stocks. As the value for the switching rate increases, firms 
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      Figure III-4: Inventory Level Comparison 
 
In this example, the optimal inventory level for Firm i is calculated by using the 
formulas (3.1.7′) and (4.1.6′), given the assumed demand distributions for Firms i and 
j. To obtain an average profit outcome for each firm under various scenarios, we first 
derive the mean demand for each of these six events and then compute the probability 
associated with an occurrence of each individual event, given the stock levels 
determined.  For example, when the switching rate between two rival firms is 0.5, the 
mean demands for Firms i and j under competitive settings are: (162.58, 162.58) for 
Event I; (103.25, 178.08) for Event II; (43.88, 154.94) for Event III; (62.58, 62.58) 
for Event IV; (154.94, 43.88) for Event V; and (178.08, 103.25) for Event VI.  
 
Optimal  
Inventory Level  
Inventory Level Comparison
Competitive Setting 





The graphs in Figure 5 show that when no transshipments are implemented, firms are 
better off as the switching rate gets higher in both competitive and cooperative 
settings. Moreover, the improved performance outcomes as a result of cooperation 
between the two firms become enlarged when these two firms have a higher 
switching rate. The degree to which coordinated inventory decisions lead to a better 
performance outcome than noncooperative inventory decisions is determined by the 
opportunities for firms to share their inventories and reduce the demand-related risks. 
The more opportunities for firms to pool their inventories and serve customers, the 
greater the performance outcome enhanced through cooperative replenishment 
decisions.  
 
Figure III-5: Profit Comparison 
 
When the two firms cooperate in their replenishment decisions to maximize joint 
profits, it would be more profitable for them to hold fewer stock units as their 
consumers become more likely to divert from one firm to another. At a high level for 
the switching rate, the two firms are better able to reduce their inventory investments 
without losing a great number of consumers to stockouts, and as a result, the two 
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decisions. On the contrary, these two firms do not benefit much from the use of 
coordinated inventory mechanism when the switching rates between them are 
relatively low.  The graph in Figure 5 shows that for switching rates greater than 0.5, 
firms achieve more profits under cooperative setting than competitive setting; 
however, there is little difference in the profit outcome between coordinated 
inventory policy and localized inventory decision when the level of switching rate is 
below 0.5.  
 
5.1.2 Results for the Scenario without Transshipments 
The extent to which transshipments affect inventory replenishment decisions and 
performance outcomes is determined by the level of transshipment price implemented 
between rival firms. Under the competitive setting, Equation (3.2.5′) in Section 3 sets 
up the condition characterizing the inventory choice for Firm i. In this formula, 
)( ii Qα  on the left-hand-side of Formula (3.2.5′) represents the likelihood that the 
market demand for Firm i is less than the chosen inventory level.  The right-hand-side 
in this formula sets the value for the threshold probability of having extra stock, 





























γβα    (3.2.5′) 
By solving this equation along with (3.2.7′), the optimal stock levels are derived for 
Firms i and j under the scenario where transshipments are implemented between the 
two rival firms. The Formula (3.2.5′) clearly reveals that the optimal inventory level 




parameters constant. Transshipment price drives up the inventory level in two ways. 
First, as transshipment price gets higher, the net revenue that Firm i earns per unit 









γ of the right-hand-side in (3.2.5′) is the expected 
revenue Firm i can obtain from transshipping goods to Firm j, and it increases with 
the transshipment price jic  for a given occurrence of transshipment. On the other 
hand, as transshipment price becomes higher, Firm i can reduce its transshipment 
payment by holding more stock and thus avoiding transshipment requests from Firm 








β is the expected cost that Firm 
i incurs when getting the transshipments from Firm j, and it increases with the 
transshipment price, ijc , for a given occurrence of transshipment. Consequently, the 
optimal stock level for each firm increases with the transshipment price, as illustrated 
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         Figure III-6: Inventory Level Comparison 
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Figure 6 also shows that under the two cooperative settings, a firm’s optimal 
inventory level does not change with the level of transshipment price. When firms 
coordinate their replenishment decisions to maximize joint profits, transshipment 
payments from one firm to another can be viewed as the same as an internal monetary 
transfer.  Under this circumstance, transshipment price does not affect the optimal 
inventory levels that are determined by maximizing the joint profits of the two firms.  
 
It is not surprising to find that the inventory level choices firms make are the same in 
the two cooperative settings. In this example, the two firms are assumed to have 
identical uniform demand distribution. As a result, their aggregate demand has a 
symmetrical triangular distribution, denoted as [0, 400, 200]. The optimal stock levels 
in the cooperative setting I are determined by solving a pair of Equations (4.2.4′) = 0, 
and (4.2.5′) = 0. In comparison, the optimal joint inventory in the cooperative setting 
II is determined by solving Equation (4.2.14) = 0. Since the two firms are assumed to 
have identical demand in this example, it is not surprising to find that these two 
cooperative scenario lead to the equivalent inventory level choice. In other words, the 
optimal order quantities that the two firms choose based on their aggregate market 
demand forecast are the same as those determined by the accumulation of the 
expected profits from each of their market demands. It would be interesting to study 
whether these two cooperative mechanisms still give rise to an equivalent inventory 






Figure 7 presents the profit outcomes for Firm i(j) when per unit transshipment prices 
charged between these two rival firms range from 0 to $48 under two cooperative and 
non-cooperative inventory decisions.  As shown in this graph, Firm i(j)’s profit has an 
inverted U-shape relationship with respect to transshipment price. Although the 
optimal inventory level chosen by each firm increases steadily with transshipment 
price, the profit outcome for Firm i(j) rises with transshipment price when it is less 
than $28 per transshipped unit; the profit outcome for Firm i(j) declines with 
transshipment price when it is greater than $28 per transshipped unit.  An intuitive 
explanation for this nonlinear effect of transshipment price on profits is as follows. At 
a high level of transshipment price, firms tend to hold a great amount of stock. Thus, 
the likelihood for the occurrence of transshipments decreases as both firms keep more 
inventory to prevent the chance of stockouts.  Under these circumstances, the 
expected transshipment revenue declines, despite an increased level for the 
transshipment price.  The expected revenue from transshipments is not sufficient to 
compensate for the expected increase in inventory-related costs, which is associated 
with a greater level of transshipment price. As a result, a high transshipment price has 
a negative impact on firm performance. On the contrary, at a low transshipment price, 
firms tend to hold fewer stocks in order to take advantage of opportunities for 
inventory sharing. Under this circumstance, transshipments are more likely to be 
employed between firms. Thus, the expected revenue through implementing 
transshipments rises with transshipment price. Although the inventory level increases 




enough to cover the incremental inventory-related costs. As such, a low 
transshipment price has a positive impact on firm performance.   
 
 
                          Figure III-7: Profit Comparison 
 
The next section examines how the implementation of transshipments affects a firm’s 
inventory replenishment decision and the resulting performance outcome when firms 
meet in various competitive settings.  
 
5.1.3 The Impacts of Transshipments on Firm Inventory Level Choice and the Profit  
Outcome in Various Competitive Settings 
Figure 8 compares the inventory levels with and without transshipments for two firms 
competing in the setting where the switching rate from one to another is 0.5 and the 
unit transshipment price between them varies between 0 and $48. The results indicate 
that within a certain range of low transshipment prices (i.e., from 0 to $36), the 
inventory levels chosen by the two rival firms are greater when no transshipments are 
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held by each of the two rival firms rises as transshipment price increases. It is shown 
that for any transshipment price beyond $36, the optimal inventory each firm holds 
with transshipments is greater than without the implementation of transshipments.  
Inventory level comparison 
 
Figure III-8: Inventory Level Comparison 
 
Previous studies have found that transshipments, when implemented among stocking 
locations operating on the same echelon, improve their service levels and 
performance outcomes through risk sharing and safety stock reduction.  Nevertheless, 
the practice of transshipments has not been investigated in a competitive setting, in 
which rival firms might face various market demands and set different services levels. 
Several interesting questions remain as to: (1) Whether the practice of transshipments 
still provides benefits when firms compete with one another; (2) what factors have 
potential to affect the improved performance outcomes arising from transshipments in 
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outcomes depending on firm service levels and demands; and (4) what transshipment 
price firms should set to achieve the greatest benefits under various competitive 
environments. Figure 9, below, graphically illustrates the performance impact of 
transshipments implemented between firms that are intense competitors, moderate 
rivals, and non competitors.   
 
From this graph, we can draw several interesting conclusions. First, whether the 
implementation of transshipments improves the performance outcome depends on the 
intensity of competition between rival firms. When two firms are perfect rivals (i.e., 
the switching rate =1), transshipments will not improve the profitability of firms.  
Instead, firms will earn more profits if they choose not to employ transshipments and 
make their inventory decisions accordingly. This is because transshipments add costs 
to firms. When switching rate between two firms is high, it is less costly to just let 
consumers divert to the alternative firm in the event of stock out.  In comparison, 
transshipments will improve the profitability of firms when the two firms are 
moderately competitive or non-rivals. The degree of performance improvements is 
affected by the level of transshipment price.  Specifically, it is found that the 
transshipment price has a non-linear impact on the profit improvement for a given 
rivalry intensity.  For example, when the two rival firms have switching rates of 0.5, 
the profit benefit that each firm gains from the practice of transshipments increases 
with transshipment price, when the level of transshipment price is below $28. In 
contrast, the profit benefits decrease with transshipment price when transshipment 
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Figure III-9: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments 
 
The forgoing discussions are based on Numerical Example 1, in which the market 
demands for the two rival firms are identical. In Example 2, we consider a situation 
where the two rival firms differ in their mean demands, while other parameters 
remain unchanged.  
5.2 Results for Example 2 
In Example 2, the mean demands are assumed to be different for the two rival firms. 
The purpose of analyzing an asymmetric demand scenario is to show whether firm 
size affects the performance outcome of transshipments; i.e., how does the practice of 
transshipments affect the profit for a large firm relative to a small firm in various 
competitive environments.  
 
In this example, we assume that Firms i and j differ only in the mean demand and that 
the switching rates between these two rivals are symmetric. Specifically, the demand 
for the small firm, or Firm i, is assumed to have a uniform distribution within [0, 
Transshipment Price
($) 
Switching rateλ =0 
Switching rateλ = 0.5 





































200]. In comparison, the large firm, or Firm j, has its demand distributed within [0, 
300].  To assess the impact of transshipments on firm performance (as measured by 
profits), given the unit transshipment price of $24, we first calculate the optimal stock 
levels for the “without transshipment” scenario by solving a set of equations (3.1.7) 
and (3.1.8).  For the “with transshipments” scenario, we solve Equations (3.2.5′) and 
(3.2.7′) to obtain the optimal stock levels for Firms i and j, respectively. Then we 
compute the expected profits associated with each of these scenarios. For example, at 
the unit transshipment price of $24, the optimal stock levels determined for Firms i 
and j are (124.746, 188.239). Given this pair of inventory levels, the probabilities for 
Firm i falling into each of the six events are: 0.1864 for Event I; 0.1238 for Event II; 
0.0987 for Event III; 0.3217 for Event IV; 0.2001 for Event V; and 0.0692 for Event 
VI.   
 
At the inventory level of (124.746, 188.239), the mean demands associated with each 
of these six events are as follows.  In Event I, the mean demands for Firms i and j are 
154.428, and 238.661, respectively.  In Event II, they are 73.4733 for Firm i, and 
263.5161 for Firm j.  In Event III, they are 31.8832 for Firm i, and 209.2052 for Firm 
j.  In Event IV, they are 54.428 for Firm i, and 88.661 for Firm j.  In Event V, they are 
146.769 for Firm i, and 65.875 for Firm j.  Finally, in Event VI, they are 173.3045 for 
Firm i, and 150.6265 for Firm j.  Given the mean demands presented above, we then 
calculate event revenues for Firms i and j based on the following variables: units 
transshipped (i.e., Xij, Xji), sales (i.e., Ri, Rj), unmet demands (i.e., Zi, Zj), and unsold 




these six events is derived as follows: 3989.664 for Event I; 3717.351 for Event II; 
2427.654 for Event III; 2721.4 for Event IV; 4960.848 for Event V; and 4479.344 for 
Event VI.  Multiplying event revenues by the derived probability associated with each 
of these six events, we get an amount of $3621.96, the expected revenue that Firm i 
achieves at the unit transshipment price of $24. After the deduction of inventory 
acquisition and carrying costs, the average profit for Firm i equals $1009.426.  In a 
similar way, we use this procedure to calculate the expected profit for Firms i and j, 
respectively, under various competitive scenarios (as indicated by different switching 
rates ranging between 0 and 1). Table 12, below, presents some of these results.   
 
5.2.1 The Impacts of Transshipments on Firm Inventory Level Choice and the Profit 
Outcomes in Various Competitive Settings 
Table III-12: The Impacts of Transshipments on Performance Outcomes 
 Switching Rate = 0 Switching Rate = 0.5 Switching Rate = 1 






















































% Change  41.99% 6.98% 10.708% -4.844% -11.765% -15.005% 
* The unit transshipment price is assumed to be $24.  
Several interesting results can be drawn from this table. First, the implementation of 
transshipments benefits both the large firm and small firm, when the rivalry intensity 
between these two rivals is relatively low. However, transshipments make neither 
firm better off when their competition intensifies to a higher level, as indicated by the 




from the implementation of transshipments are decreasing as the two rival firms 
become more competing.  More interestingly, we find that the small firm always 
benefits more from transshipments than does the large firm at various levels of 
switching rates ranging between 0 and 1.  This is true both in actual monetary terms 
and in percentage terms. For example, the results show that the performance 
improvements the small firm (i.e., Firm i) achieves through transshipments are 3.995 
(6.016) times in absolute (percentage) terms as the benefits for the large firm, when 
switching rate between these two firms is 0.  As the intensity of rivalry between these 
two firms increases, the small firm achieves more profit benefits through 
transshipments than does the large firm. When the switching rate is 0.5, the practice 
of transshipments endows the small firm (i.e., Firm i) with an improved performance 
outcome, while making the large firm (i.e., Firm j) fare worse.  These findings 
suggest that the positive impacts from transshipments depend on the relative demand 
levels of the firms, and on the degree of competition between the two rivals.  
 
In Table 12, we present the differential impacts of transshipments on performance 
outcomes for Firms i and j at a given unit transshipment price of $24.  The table 
shows how firm profitability is affected by transshipments given different levels of 
transshipment price.  The results from the tables are illustrated in Figures 11 and 12. 
They illustrate the performance impacts of transshipments for large and small firms, 
respectively, given different levels of transshipment price, from 0 to $48.  Before 
discussing the impact of the practice of transshipments on firm performance, it is 




transshipments” scenario differ from those chosen in the “without transshipment” 
scenario, and how transshipment price affects inventory decision-making for firms 
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Figure III-10: The Impact of Transshipment on Firm’s Inventory Level 
 
The graphs in Figure 10 reveal the positive impact of transshipment price on firm 
inventory decisions. As transshipment price rises, the optimal stock levels chosen by 
both the small firm and the large firm increase.  Moreover, we find there is a broader 
range of transshipment price, under which the implementation of transshipment 
facilitates the reduction of inventory investment for the firm with greater market 
demand. As shown in Figure 10, the institution of transshipments decreases the 
inventories that the large firm holds when transshipment price is less than $41 (given 
a switching rate of 0.5).  In comparison, the implementation of transshipments 
enables the small firm to hold less stock only when transshipment price is less than 
$32.  Finally, simply comparing Curves I with II in Figure 10, we find that the growth 
rate of stock level with respect to transshipment price is greater for the small firm 
(i.e., Firm i) than for the large firm (i.e., Firm j). This result suggests that the optimal 
Transshipment Price 
Inventory Level Comparison
Inventory level of large firm without 
transshipments for switching rate of 0.5 
Inventory level of small firm without 
transshipments for switching rate of 0.5 
Inventory level of small firm with 
transshipments (I) 





inventory level that a large firm holds is less sensitive to transshipment price than for 
a small firm. In other words, a large firm is less likely than the small firm to take into 
account transshipment price when making inventory decisions.  
 
 
 Figure III-11: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments for Large Firm  
 
Figure 11 compares the profit outcomes that a large firm (i.e., Firm j) incurs with and 
without the implementation of transshipments for three scenarios: The large and small 
firms are close competitors, moderate rivals, or non-competitors. The impacts of 
transshipments on the profits of the small firm (i.e., Firm i) are provided in Figure 12.  
From Figure 11, two factors are found to determine whether a large firm benefits 
from the implementation of transshipments: the level of transshipment price and the 
competitive intensity between the two rivals.  When two firms compete intensely (as 
indicated by the switching rate of 1), transshipments will not benefit the large firm in 
terms of the profit outcome.  The large firm achieves higher profits without 
transshipments. As well, transshipment price also affects profits. As shown in Figure 
11, there is an inverted U-shape relationship between transshipment price and the 
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In comparison, the performance improvement for the small firm, or Firm i, 
continuously declines with transshipment price, as shown in Figure 12.  We also find 
that the small firm, unlike the large firm, benefits from transshipments even under 
moderate competition (as indicated by the switching rate of 0.5).  
 
 
Figure III-12: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments for Small Firm 
 
The main point from the forgoing analysis is that the performance improvements (as 
measured by the increase in profits) resulting from transshipments diminish with 
competitive intensity between rivals.  This is true for both the large and the small 
firm. The reason for this relationship is that under high levels of competitive 
intensity, switching consumers “substitute” for transshipments, thereby reducing the 
benefits of a transshipment policy.  A more difficult question is what causes 
transshipment price to differentially impact the large and small firms.  To understand 
why this might occur, we start by comparing the probabilities associated with each of 
the six events (see Figure 13).  We have noted from Figure 10 that the optimal stock 
levels for both the small and large firm (a.k.a. Firms i and j, respectively) increase 
steadily with transshipment price. The increasing rate of optimal inventory with 
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firm.  For example, Firm i would hold an additional 24 stock units if transshipment 
price rises from $10 to $22. By contrast, Firm j only adds 5 stock units.  The fact that 
a small firm increases its inventory to a greater extent than does a large firm in 
response to an increase in transshipment price leads to asymmetric occurrences of 
transshipments between the firms. Figure 13 plots the optimal stock levels for Firms i 
and j (as noted by Qi and Qj), and the six scenarios (as noted by I, II, III, IV, V, and 
VI) that are associated with two levels of transshipment price, $10 and $22.  














From Figure 13, we can see that as Firms i and j increase their inventories in response 
to a rising transshipment price, it becomes less likely for the two firms to both stock 
out, as indicated by the shrinking area for Event I from Graph (1) to (2). On the 
contrary, there is an increased probability of having the two firms both overstocked 
when transshipment price rises from $10 to $22, as shown by the expanded region for 
Event IV.  As for the amount of transshipments between these two firms, it is 
intuitive to find that a large firm tends to transship more to a small firm than the 
Transshipment Price = $10 Transshipment Price = $22 
I I II II
III 
III 
IV IV V V 
VI VI 




reverse.  Such asymmetric occurrences are simply because the large firm tends to 
hold greater inventories, on average, than does the small firm at any given 
transshipment price. However, the likelihood of transshipments from the small firm to 
the large firm increases with transshipment price, while the occurrence of 
transshipments from the large firm to the small firm becomes less likely.  
 
In the two graphs in Figure 13, Event II represents a scenario when Firm i transships 
all of its redundant stock to Firm j to satisfy Firm j’s stockout demand.  The goods 
transshipped from Firm i to j, nevertheless, are not sufficient to fully cover all of the 
under-stocked demand at Firm j’s location. In comparison, Event III represents the 
situation when the transshipments from Firm i to j are great enough to fully satisfy the 
extra demand occurring in Firm j’s market. Under this circumstance, Firm i still has 
some units left over after transshipping to Firm j.  In a similar way, Events V and VI 
identify the two scenarios for transshipping goods from Firm j to i.  Comparing each 
of these four regions (i.e., II, III, IV, and V) between Graphs (1) and (2), we can draw 
two conclusions.  First, the likelihood that Firm i transships to Firm j is greater at a 
higher transshipment price. The goods that Firm i transships to Firm j are either all of 
its extra stock (as represented by Event II), or part of the additional inventories it has 
(as indicated by Event III). Second, the probability of transshipping goods from Firm 
j to i is lower with an increase in transshipment price. In other word, a high 
transshipment price suppresses the probability of transshipping goods from the large 
firm to the small firm, while making it more likely for the occurrence of 




We can find that the changing patterns in the probabilities associated with the series 
of Events from I to VI hold under various transshipment prices.  The only exception 
occurs with Event II, which refers to the scenario when the transshipments from Firm 
i to j are not sufficient to completely meet Firm j’s excess demands. The graphs in 
Figure 14 illustrate a reduction in the probability of Event II when transshipment 
price rises from $22 to $34.   














A closer look at the two graphs in Figure 14 helps explain why the probability 
associated with Event II decreases as transshipment price increases from $22 to $34. 
At a transshipment price of $34, the joint inventories the two firms hold include 
309.084 units, greater than the maximum demand (equal to 300) that Firm j has in its 
market.  As a result, the goods transshipped from Firm i to j are sufficient to 
completely satisfy the excess demand for Firm j.  In other words, it is the expanded 
Transshipment Price = $22 Transshipment Price = $34 
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area associated with Event III that suppresses the occurrence of Event II, as shown by 
the smaller region II in Graph (4) compared to that in Graph (3).   
 
Figure 15 provides an in-depth illustration of the relationship between transshipment 
price and the resulting probabilities related to each of the six events.  These graphs 
extend the forgoing discussion based on three different transshipment prices to the 
whole range of transshipment price from 0 to $48, and provide consistent arguments 
with regard to the relationship between transshipment price and the likelihood of each 
of the six events. As shown in the graph (top-right), the probabilities for the 
occurrence of Event I steadily decrease with transshipment price, suggesting it 
becomes less likely that the two firms will both stock out as transshipment price 
increases. On the other side, the probability for the two firms to be both overstocked 
increases with transshipment price, as shown in the graph (Event IV).  
Figure III-15: Event Probability and Transshipment Price 










































































As discussed in the preceding section, the likelihood for the occurrence of Event II 
increases with transshipment price to a threshold level.  As transshipment price gets 
higher than the threshold value, the probability that Firm i and j fall into Event II 
declines with transshipment price. The probability of Event III, however, shows a 
continuous increase with transshipment price. By contrast, the occurrence of Events 
V and VI shows an opposite trend with respect to transshipment price. Overall, 
transshipments from a large firm to a small firm become less likely as transshipment 
price increases.   
 
The analysis, so far, has shown how transshipment price affects the likelihood for the 
occurrence of each of the six events that Firms i and j experience in a single-period 
replenishment cycle. To study the impact of transshipments on firm profits, we also 
need to assess the revenues that firms achieve under various scenarios. Table 13, 
below, provides the formula to calculate revenues associated with Events I to VI. The 
notations in Table 13 are the same as those used in Section 2.  
Table III-13: Event Revenues for Large and Small Firms 
 Firm i Firm j 
Event I )( iiii QDpQp −×−×                  )( jjjj QDpQp −×−×  

















−×−+× τ  )( jjjijj QDcDp −×−×  
Event IV )( iiii DQsDp −×+×  )( jjjj DQsDp −×+×  
























From Table 13, we can see that there are transshipments that occur in Events II, III, 
V, and VI.  In these events, transshipment price plays a double-role in affecting event 
revenue.  Above all, transshipment price determines the unit revenue received by the 
firm that transships goods, and the payment per transshipment from the firm that 
receives a shipment.  Secondly, transshipment price has an indirect impact on 
revenues since the optimal inventory levels that firms adopt are related to 
transshipment price. The combination of these effects makes it hard to draw 
straightforward conclusion regarding the effect of transshipment price on revenues.  
Moreover, the problem becomes more complicated in the context of two firms with 
different mean demands. Figures 16 and 17 present the calculated average revenues 
associated with events from I and VI for Firms i and j.   
Figure III-16: Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events I, II, and III 
 Firm i – a small firm Firm j – a large firm 
Event I 
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From Figure 16, we observe that transshipment price affects revenues differently for 
the small firm (i.e. Firm i) than for the large firm (i.e., Firm j). For example, Firm i’s 
revenue in Event II increases with transshipment price, whereas Firm j’s revenue 
decreases.  As shown in Table 13, Firm i’s revenue in Event II consists of two parts: 
The revenue from selling to its own customers, and the revenue it receives from 
transshipping all overstocked goods to Firm j. As transshipment price rises, Firm i 
tends to hold a greater inventory and thus has more extra stock to transship.  As a 
result, transshipment revenue for Firm i is positively related to transshipment price. In 
comparison, the event revenue for Firm j under this scenario is composed of three 
segments: 1) The revenue from selling to its own market; 2) the transshipment 
payment it makes to Firm i; and 3) the penalty cost it incurs from not being able to 
satisfy all of the market demand, even after receiving transshipments from Firm i. 
Transshipment price, in this example, has both positive and negative impacts on the 
revenue for Firm j. On the negative side, the transshipment payments that Firm j 
makes to Firm i increase with the unit transshipment price and with the greater 
transshipment quantities associated with a higher transshipment price.  On the 
positive side, Firm j tends to hold greater inventories as transshipment price rises and 
thus gains more revenues from selling to its own market and reducing the penalty cost 












it would otherwise incur.  The negative effect of transshipment price on revenue, 
nevertheless, dominates. Therefore, overall revenue for Firm j in Event II decreases 
with transshipment price.  
 
In the case of Event III, the revenue for Firm i steadily increases with transshipment 
price, whereas the revenue for Firm j is affected by transshipment price in a more 
complicated way. From Figure 10, we note that the marginal increase in optimal 
inventory for Firm j is decreasing with transshipment price at a lower range of 
transshipment price. In contrast, it is increasing with transshipment price when 
transshipment price rises beyond a threshold level. This non-uniform pattern can help 
explain why the growth rate of Firm j’s revenue in Event II is first decreasing with 
transshipment price and then increasing when transshipment price rises above a 
critical level. The revenue for Firm j in Event III can be written as: 
)( jjjijj QDcDp −×−× , as shown in Table 13. In the numerical example, the market 
price jp  is given at $40, and transshipment price is denoted by jic . To examine the 
question as to how the event revenue changes with transshipment price, we first 
use ' )( jQf to represent the growth rate of optimal inventory for Firm j with respect to 
transshipment price. Drawing upon the forgoing analysis, we have the following 
inequalities: 1) ' )( jQf > 0 for transshipment price within [0, 48]; 2) 
''
)( jQ
f < 0 when 
transshipment price is less than a critical level; and 3) '' )( jQf > 0 when the 
transshipment price is greater than the critical level. Taking the first derivative of the 




revenue as: )( jQjijj fcQD ′×++− . In Event III, it is known that Firm j’s inventory 
level jQ is always less than its market demand jD .  Therefore, the growth rate of 
revenue is positive when the following inequality holds: jjQji DQfc j >+′× )( ; on the 
other side, the growth rate of revenue is negative when jjQji DQfc j <+′× )( . These 
inequality expressions can be used to explain the findings that first: Firm j’s revenue 
in Event 3 increases with transshipment price when the transshipment price is less 
than $18; then decreases with transshipment price when the transshipment price is 
within ($18, $40); and it increases with transshipment price when the transshipment 
price is greater than $40. In Section 2, we have discussed how to set a feasible range 
for the transshipment price to make sure that the transshipment price within this range 
is acceptable to both sender and recipient. Given the cost parameters assumed in this 
example, the feasible range for the transshipment price is [$12, $48].   
 
So far, we have analyzed the scenarios when the direction of transshipments is from 
Firm i to j, as represented by Events II and III. It may be expected that the revenues 
associated with Events V and VI for Firm i(j)  have a similar pattern as those for Firm 
j(i) in Events II and III, given that Events V and VI differ from Events II and III only 
in the direction of transshipments. However, transshipments between Firms i and j are 
not symmetric.  It is reasonable to assume that more goods may be expected to be 
transshipped from the large firm to the small firm than the other way, simply because 
the large firm, on average, holds greater inventory than the small firm. Actually, the 
answer to this question is not that simple. What makes the question complicated is 




transshipment price rises.  Figure 17 (below) graphically presents the relationship 
between transshipment price and revenues for Firms i and j for Events IV, V, and VI.  












































In comparison to Events II and III, Figure 17 suggests that when the large firm 
transships its extra stock to the small firm, the revenue for both the small and large 
firm increases steadily with transshipment price. This result is distinct from those 
related to Events II and III.  
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The revenues reported in Figures 16 and 17 are deterministic values in that these 
results have not taken into account different probabilities associated with the 
occurrence of various events from I to VI.   In Figure 15, we presented the 
probabilities for Events from I to VI at transshipment prices ranging from 0 to $48. 
Multiplying the event probability by its respective revenue, we get the expected event 
revenues for Firms i and j. These results are summarized in Figures 18 and 19.  
Figure III-18: Expected Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events I, II, and III 
 Event I Event II Event III 
Firm i – 
small firm 























Firm j – 
large firm 





















The graphs in Figure 18 support the notion that transshipment price has differential 
impacts on expected event revenues for the small firm and the large firm. As 
transshipment price increases, the probability that Firms i and j both stock out is 
steadily reduced, as represented by Event I. Although the revenues related to Event I 
increase with transshipment price for the two firms, the expected revenue for the 
small firm (i.e., Firm i) has an inverted-U shaped relationship with transshipment 
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price.  In comparison, the expected revenue for the large firm (i.e., Firm j) under this 
scenario is monotonically declining with transshipment price. Such differences are 
also present in the relationship between transshipment price and expected revenues 
for Event II. In the case of Event III, the expected revenues for both small and large 
firms monotonically increase with transshipment price. Similarly, the consistent 
relationship between transshipment price and expected revenues are found in Events 
IV and VI, as revealed in Figure 19. In these two events, the expected revenues for 
Firms i and j decrease with transshipment price.  
Figure III-19: Expected Revenues for Small and Large Firms in Events IV, V, and VI 
 Event IV Event V Event VI 
Firm i – 
small firm 



























Firm j – 
large firm 




































Event V refers to a scenario where the large firm (i.e., Firm j) transshipments some of 
its extra stock to Firm i, a small firm. With the occurrence of transshipments, the 
market demands of Firm i are completely satisfied. It is interesting to find that the 
expected revenue that Firm j gets from the implementation of transshipments 
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increases with transshipment price, but at a decreasing rate. On the other hand, the 
expected revenue that Firm i gets after accepting the transshipments from Firm j is 
increasing with transshipment price, and then decreasing as transshipment price rises 
from 0 to $48. Comparing the results in Event V with those in Event II, we argue that 
transshipment price impacts the expected revenue for the small firm differently from 
it does for the large firm within and across events.  
 
Overall, the expected revenues for Firms i and j are the summation of event revenues, 
weighted by the probability related to each of the six events. The expected profits for 
Firms i and j are calculated by subtracting inventory costs from the expected revenue. 
Inventory expenses include wholesale purchasing costs and inventory carrying costs. 
Figure 20 presents the expected revenue, inventory costs, and expected profits for 
Firms i and j at various transshipment prices. The steeper curves in the graph for Firm 
i suggests that the expected revenue and inventory costs are more elastic for the small 
firm with respect to transshipment price compared to those for the large firm, or Firm 
j. To investigate how the expected profits for Firms i and j are affected by the level of 
transshipment price, the values for the expected profits are redrawn in Figure 21.  
Figure III-20: Expected Revenues vs. Inventory Costs with Transshipments 
Expected Revenues Vs. Inventory Costs 
Large Firm – Firm j  Small Firm – Firm i 
 






























The two curves in Figure 21 represent the expected profits that Firms i and j achieve 
in the scenario when transshipments are implemented, and the transshipment price 
varies from 0 to $48.   
 
Figure III-21: Expected Profits with Transshipments 












Figure 21 clearly suggests that transshipment price has differential effects on the 
expected profits for the small and large firms.  Specifically, there is an inverted-U 
shaped relationship between transshipment price and the expected profits of the large 
firm, or Firm j.  The expected profits of the small firm, or Firm i, are negatively 
related to transshipment price. Moreover, Figure 21 reveals that the small firm has 
greater expected profits under a transshipment policy than does the large firm when 
transshipment price is relatively low, or less than $8.  On the contrary, the expected 
profits under a transshipment policy are greater for the large firm than for the small 
firm when transshipment price rises above $8.  To examine whether firms benefit 
from the implementation of transshipments, Figure 22 compares the expected profits 
for firms when transshipment are implemented to the expected profits without 
transshipments.   
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Figure III-22: The Performance Impacts of Transshipments in Various Competitive 
Settings 
 
Interestingly, we find that the small firm consistently benefits more from the 
implementation of transshipments than does the large firm no matter the competitive 
intensity (as measured by switching rate).  Moreover, the result that the small firm 
benefits more than large firm from transshipments always holds true independently of 
the transshipment price level. These findings complement those from Figure 21. It 
seems that the large firm gains greater profits from the practice of transshipments 
than does the small firm. However, the relative benefits from the practice of 
transshipments are greater for the small firm.  For example, the graph illustrates that 
only the small firm benefits from transshipments when the switching rate between 
firms is 0.5.  When the switching rate rises to 1.0, neither firm is found to benefit 
from transshipments.  
 
Based on the forgoing discussion, we conclude that there are several factors affecting 
the performance benefits that firms achieve through the strategy of transshipments. 
These factors include: the rivalry intensity between firms, the transshipment price, 
and the market demand that one firm has relative to the other.   
Firm i – small firm  Firm i – small firm  
Firm i – small firm  
Firm j – large firm  Firm j – large firm  




5.2.2 The Impacts of Transshipments on Joint Inventory Level and Aggregate Profit 
Outcomes in Various Competitive Settings 
In the previous section, we have discussed the impacts of transshipments on the 
inventory levels and the profit outcomes for Firms i, and j.  In this section, we focus 
on how transshipments impact the joint inventory of the two firms and the differences 
in aggregate profits that firms achieve from the implementation of transshipments 
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Figure III-23: The Impacts of Transshipments on Joint Inventories of Firms 
 
In Figure 23, the flat line represents the joint inventory that Firms i and j hold when 
the two firms compete in a market with a switching rate of 0.5, and when no 
transshipments take place between the two firms.  In comparison, the upward sloping 
line presents the inventories that Firms i and j jointly carry when the two firms 
transship their stocks at various transshipment prices ranging from 0 to $48. Two 
conclusions are drawn from this graph. First, transshipment price has a positive effect 
on the joint inventory held by the two firms; in other words, the amount of inventory 
that Firms i and j jointly hold is greater at a higher transshipment price. Moreover, the 
inventory that the two firms jointly hold when no transshipments take place is 
Transshipment Price  
Joint inventory level 
(in units) 
Joint inventory with 
transshipments
Joint inventory without transshipments 




different from the inventory levels under a transshipment policy.  Specifically, firms 
hold greater inventories when there are no transshipments, as compared to in the 
scenario with transshipments when the unit transshipment price is less than $36. With 
the unit transshipment price rising above $36, the joint inventories that firms hold 
with transshipments are greater than without transshipments.   
 
 
Figure III-24: The Impacts of Transshipments on Joint Profits of Firms 
 
The graphs in Figure 24 shows the differences in the joint profits that Firms i and j 
achieve through the practice of transshipments under various competitive settings. 
The results suggest first, the joint performance benefits from transshipments are 
greatest when the two firms experience no competition, as indicated by the switching 
rate of 0. As the switching rate between the two firms rises from 0 to 1.0, the joint 
benefits that the firms achieve through the practice of transshipments are declining 
and then becoming negative. In particular, it is found that the implementation of 
transshipments no longer improves the joint profits of the two firms, relative to the 
scenario without transshipments, when there is a switching rate between 0.5 and 1. 
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when the participating firms compete less intensely with one another. Furthermore, it 
is shown that in any of the three settings illustrated in Figure 24, joint benefits from 
transshipments are greatest when the unit transshipment price is $20.  
 
The above result raises a follow-up question: What impacts does the practice of 
transshipments have on small and large firm, respectively, when the two firms, 
viewed together, achieve maximal performance benefits through transshipments. 
Figure 25 presents the performance impacts of transshipments for Firms i and j when 
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Figure III-25: The Profit Impact of the Transshipment Strategy that Maximizes Joint 
Benfits 
 
The main findings from Figure 25 are three-fold. First, at the transshipment price of 
$20, both small and large firms benefit from the implementation of transshipments 
when the switching rate between them is less than 0.25. Secondly, transshipments 
benefit the small firm only, when the switching rate between the two firms is greater 
than 0.25, but less than 0.75. Finally, neither firm benefits from the implementation of 
transshipments when the switching rate is greater than 0.75.  These results suggest 
that it is necessary to provide the large firm, or Firm j, with an extra incentive to 
($) 
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implement transshipments when the switching rate between the two firms is within 
[0.25, 0.5]. As shown in Figure 24, the implementation of transshipments improves 
the system-wide profits when the switching rate is below 0.5. However, what Figure 
25 reveals is that the large firm, or Firm j, does not benefit from the practice of 
transshipments when the switching rate is between [0.25, 0.5]. Under this 
circumstance, it is, therefore, important to reduce the asymmetric benefits (costs) 
between small and large firms. One approach is to use asymmetric transshipment 
prices between the small and large firms. An alternative solution is to employ side 
payments from the small firm to the large firm. The question of how to design an 
appropriate, effective mechanism remains for future research.  
 
5.2.3 The Impacts of Order Coordination on Firm Inventory Level Choice in the Joint 
Decision-Making Environment with Transshipments 
In Section 4.2, we have presented the analysis focusing on how the optimal inventory 
level decisions of firms are made when two firms operate in a joint decision-making 
environment, and when transshipments are implemented between them.  Following 
Rudi et al. (2001), we first investigate the scenario, in which the inventory level 
decisions of the two firms are determined to maximize their aggregate profits. In this 
case, there is no effort to coordinate the ordering decisions made by firms, and the 
optimal order quantities for Firms i and j are derived by solving Equations (4.2.4′) 
and (4.2.5′), jointly.  In comparison, the second scenario we developed assumes that 
the two firms make their joint inventory level decision based on the expected 




relative market demands.  In this setting, the optimal total inventory for the two firms 
is determined by solving Equation (4.2.13). The ratio of the inventory allocated to 
each location (i.e., Qi/Qj) equals to the relative forecasted market demands of the two 
firms (i.e., Di/Dj).  As compared to the previous setting, this scenario involves order 
coordination between firms.   
 
The results based on Numerical Example 1 in Section 5.1.2 suggest that these two 
joint decision-making mechanisms are equivalent when firms have identical demand 
distribution and other cost parameters are symmetric.  Nevertheless, it remains 
unknown whether order coordination makes difference in the inventory decision and 
profit outcomes when firms have different market demands. This section compares 
the optimal inventory levels and the profit outcomes that are determined by these two 
decision-making rules.  
 
In this numerical example, the market demands for Firms i and j are assumed to have 
uniform distribution denoted as follows: Di ~ U[0, 200], Dj ~U[0,300]. Table 14 
provides the expressions for those key probability parameters included in (4.2.4′) and 
(4.2.5′).  
Table III-14: Expressions for Key Parameters 





































In Table 14, the probabilities associated with various events are expressed as 
functions of order quantities for Firms i and j. Using these notations and the assumed 
values for relevant cost parameters, the optimal inventory levels for Scenario I (see 
Section 4.2.1), *iQ , 
*
jQ are calculated by solving Equations (4.2.4′) = 0, and (4.2.5′) 
=0. The results are: *iQ = 116.129 and 
*
jQ = 174.194. Thus, their total inventory equals 
to 290.323.  
 
Next, we use Equation (4.2.13) and Table 10 to calculate the joint optimal inventory 
level for Scenario II (see Section 4.2.2).  In this scenario, Firms i and j are assumed to 
make their joint order quantity decision based on their aggregate demand forecasts. 
Then the two firms allocate the optimal inventory.  In this example, the ratio of the 
inventory allocated to the two firms Qi/Qj equals to 2/3. Thus, the value for n is 5/2. 
Table 14 provides the expressions for the probability parameters included in Equation 
(4.2.13). Given the assumption that Firms i and j have uniform demand distributions, 
their aggregate demand has a trapezoidal distribution. Table 15 shows the expressions 
for the key probability parameters used in Equation (4.2.13).  































Using the notations in Table 14, the optimal joint inventory *Q is derived by solving 





* , and QQj ×= 6.0
* . The results are as follows: 991.291* =Q , 
796.116* =iQ , and 195.175
* =jQ .  It is shown that firms hold similar amount of stock 
in Scenarios I and II. This finding suggests that the two cooperative mechanisms lead 
firms to have equivalent inventory decisions and profit outcomes.  
5.3 Results for Example 3 
In Section 5.2, we analyzed the case where the demand differences between a large 
firm and a small firm are moderate.  We find that transshipments benefit small firms 
more than large firms in reducing inventory investments and in improving 
performance outcomes.  These differences are present under various competitive 
settings and become greater as firms compete more vigorously.  In this section, we 
further investigate to what extent transshipments reward small firms 
disproportionately to large firms when the scale of demand differences becomes 
further enlarged.  In Example 3, the demand for the large firm (Firm j) is assumed to 
be uniformly distributed within [0, 400], and the demand for the small firm (Firm i) is 
within [0, 200].  
 
The numerical results based on Example 3 are consistent with those from Example 2. 
In Section 5.3.1, we first present the inventory and profit outcomes in the scenario 
when no transshipments are implemented between Firms i and j. Next, Section 5.3.2 
provides the inventory level and profit outcomes in the scenario when transshipments 
are implemented between the two firms. Finally, the impacts of transshipments on 




5.3.1 Results for the Scenario without Transshipments 
 
Figure III-26: Inventory Levels Under Various Competitive Settings 
 
Consistent with the previous findings, the optimal inventory levels that Firms i and j 
choose under various competitive settings remain nearly the same.  Given the 
assumption of symmetrical switching rates, it is expected that firms make their 
inventory decisions regardless of the level of switching rate. This argument is verified 
by the flat lines in Figure 26 suggesting the constant inventory levels that are chosen 
by firms for various switching rates within [0, 1].  Although firms maintain constant 
inventory levels, the profit outcomes for both small and large firms increase with the 
switching rate. As shown in Figure 27, Firms i and j both have greater profits when 
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Figure III-27: Profit Outcomes under Various Competitive Settings 
A potential explanation for this result is that firms have more opportunities to share 
their inventories when consumers are more likely to switch from one firm to another. 
As a consequence, the expected revenues for both firms are greater when the 
switching rate between the two firms is higher. Since the inventory-related costs are 
constant for different switching rates, the increase in the expected revenue contributes 
to the performance improvements, as indicated by the higher profit outcome.  
 
5.3.2 Results for the Scenario with Transshipments 
In the scenario, when transshipments are implemented between Firms i and j, the 
results are also consistent with those in the previous example. As shown in Figure 28, 
both small and large firms increase their inventory levels with transshipment price. 
However, the inventory level chosen by the small firm is more elastic with respect to 
transshipment price than it is for the large firm. This finding further suggests that 
transshipment price has differential impacts on the inventory replenishment decisions 
for firms facing differing market demands.  
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Figure III-28: Inventory Levels at Various Transshipment Prices 
 
Figure III-29: Profit Outcomes at Various Transshipment Prices 
 
In Example 2, we have found the presence of an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between transshipment price and the profit outcome of the large firm. Moreover, it is 
found that there is a negative relationship between transshipment price and the profit 
outcome for the small firm. These findings also hold true in Example 3, where the 
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5.3.3 The Impacts of Transshipments on Firm Inventory Level Choice and the Profit 
Outcomes in Various Competitive Settings 
The graphs in Figures 30 and 31 compare the optimal inventory levels with and 
without transshipments for Firm i and j, respectively, assuming the switching rate of 
0.5.   
 
Figure III-30: Inventory Levels for Small Firm with and without Transshipments 
 
The upward-sloping curve in Figure 30 suggests a positive impact of transshipment 
price on Firm i’s inventory level. As transshipment price rises, the optimal stock 
levels chosen by the small firm increase. Similar results are found for Firm j, as 
shown in Figure 31.  
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Comparing Figure 30 with Figure 31, we find that although the inventory levels for 
both small and large firms increase with transshipment price, the growth rate for the 
small firm is increasing with transshipment price, and the growth rate for the large 
firm is decreasing with transshipment price. Such differences in the growth rate of 
inventory levels were also found in the previous example, in which the mean demand 
for the large firm is greater than that for the small firm by 50 units.  
 
Figure III-32: Joint Inventories with and without Transshipments 
 
In Figure 32, the flat line represents the joint inventory that Firms i and j hold when 
the two firms compete in the market with a consumer’s switching rate of 0.5, and 
when no transshipments are implemented between the two firms. In comparison, the 
upward sloping line displays the inventories that Firms i and j jointly hold when the 
two firms implement transshipments under various transshipment prices from 0 to 
$48. It is found that the joint inventories that Firms i and j hold with transshipments 
are greater than those held by the two firms without transshipments, when the unit 
transshipment price is above $34. Note that in Example 2, it was found that the 
threshold transshipment price was $36. In these two examples, we have held 
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two firms might lead to a lower threshold transshipment price in Example 3, 
compared to that in Example 2.  
 
The performance impacts of transshipments for Example 3 are presented in the 
following table. Table 16 indicates that the implementation of transshipments benefits 
the small firm more than the large firm at various competitive settings.  This finding 
is consistent with the results presented in Table 12 for Example 2.  
Table III-16: The Impacts of Transshipments on Performance Outcomes 
 Switching Rate = 0 Switching Rate = 
0.5 
Switching Rate = 1 




























673.794 1433.404 933.926 1569.586 1197.774 1708.898
Change in 
absolute term 
855.749 217.018 595.617 80.836 331.769 -58.476 
% Change  127.005% 15.14% 63.776% 5.15% 27.699% -3.421% 
* The unit transshipment price is assumed to be $12.  
6. Conclusions and Future Research 
The analytical model developed in this essay investigates the practice of 
transshipments between two competing stocking locations. Many previous studies in 
supply chain management have modeled the performance impacts of uncertainties, 
such as demand and lead time variability, and their implications for inventory 
management. The role of competition in affecting the performance outcomes of 
transshipments has not received much attention. This essay examines inventory 
replenishment decisions and the application of the transshipments strategy in various 




transshipments are likely to be employed between rival firms (e.g., auto dealerships). 
The results suggest that there exist opportunities for rival firms to collaborate through 
transshipments. In other words, the practice of transshipments is able to improve firm 
performance (as measured by profits), even when the participating firms are direct 
rivals.  Moreover, the numerical results are used to illustrate how firms with 
asymmetric demands benefit differently from transshipments under various 
competitive settings.  
 
It is found that transshipments provide more performance improvements for the small 
firm than for the large firm. Such imbalanced benefits become more substantial as the 
competition intensity between the two firms increases. These results suggest that it is 
important to design an effective, appropriate incentive mechanisms (e.g., monetary 
transfers, asymmetric transshipment prices) to initiate transshipments between rival 
firms with varying demands.  
 
A few interesting questions remain for further research. One extension is to 
investigate what the performance impacts of transshipments are for firms operating 
under the competitive environment, in which the prices of their products vary with the 
rivalry intensity between firms.  In this study, the retail prices of product are held 
constant under various competitive settings. It would be more interesting to 
characterize the market of greater competition with both a lower level of retail price 
and a higher value of switching rate.  The use of endogenous price and switching rate 




with their inventory decision.  The second extension of this essay is to relax the 
assumption that the demands at different locations are independent.  The study of 
transshipments between rivals firms with correlated demands would help us 
understand to what extent the factor of competition moderates the benefits from the 
risk-pooling strategy enabled through transshipments.  
Chapter 4: Conclusions 
This dissertation explores two types of strategic behaviors and market outcomes: (1) 
How strategic interactions across markets affect multimarket competitors in their 
pricing behaviors and collusive outcomes, and (2) how transshipments in a 
competitive market affect rival firms in their inventory decisions and profit outcomes.   
 
In Essay 1, a conjectural variation model is developed to examine how a firm makes 
product pricing decisions when taking into account the strategic contacts the firm has 
with its rivals across multiple markets.  An insight that has not received much 
attention, but revealed from our formal analysis of competitive behavior in a 
multimarket contact setting, is that similarity in production costs plays an important 
moderating role in the inverse relationship between multimarket contact and rivalry 
intensity. That is, multimarket contact is more effective in facilitating tacit collusive 
pricing when it occurs between rival firms having similar production costs than when 
it occurs between rival firms with dissimilar production costs.  
 
Such differential impacts of multimarket contact on collusive behavior arise from the 




variation with respect to one another, and more importantly, they have less degree of 
vertical product differentiation. It is the formation of higher conjectural variation and 
the presence of greater product substitutability that reinforce the collusion facilitating 
effects of multimarket contact for firms having similar production costs.  
 
This finding gives firms competing in single market and multimarket contexts 
different implications with respect to product development strategy. For example, 
when two firms compete in a local market with a single product, one option for a firm 
to avoid fierce competition is to distinguish itself from the rival firm by introducing 
differentiated products. The more dissimilar the products are, the less likelihood for 
the occurrence of a pricing war. However, it would be a different story if firms 
competed simultaneously in multiple markets. Under this scenario, tacit collusion and 
lower rivalry intensity are more likely to sustain when the product lines firms develop 
are similar with one another. Consequently, the competitive implications of product 
differentiation strategy are dramatically different in single market and multimarket 
contact settings.  
 
Competitive interactions across multiple markets and their economic consequences 
have received growing interest in the marketing and strategic management literatures.  
In a review paper by Jayachandran et al. (1999), the authors discuss, in detail, the 
implications of multimarket competition for marketing strategies, in particular, 
product line rivalry and market entry decision.  The notion of mutual forbearance and 




businesses (Hughes and Oughton 1993). Along with these studies, our work extends 
and enhances the understanding of the questions: What nature of multimarket contact 
facilitates tacit collusion and how these collusion enhancing effects differ in various 
market circumstances.  
 
Moreover, the finding that the tacit-colluding opportunities endowed with 
multimarket contact are more likely to hold between carriers with similar production 
costs has policy implications. Traditionally, it has been well recognized that high cost 
carriers tend more than low cost carriers to engage in tacit collusive pricing. In the 
multimarket contact setting, however, low cost carriers also have positive reasons to 
engage in mutual forbearance when their rivals are also low cost carriers. As a result, 
it may not be sufficient to just open airline markets to low-cost competition without 
any regulatory oversight. Since low-cost carriers appear to engage in tacit collusion, 
some regulatory oversight might still be needed.  
 
Finally, it is also important to realize that although multimarket contact enhances tacit 
collusive prices for both low cost and high cost carriers, it matters less as their 
products become more differentiated within and between markets.  
 
There are several research extensions from the multimarket contact essay. Since our 
empirical analysis is based on the U.S. airline market in the year 2002, one concern of 
using this dataset is that the U.S. airline market had not yet fully recovered from the 




overestimated or underestimated. In future research, it would be worthwhile to 
attempt to estimate the airfare impact of multimarket contact during other time 
periods.  
 
Another limitation of the current study is that it investigates the competitive effects of 
multimarket contact only in a static setting. An interesting question remains how 
multimarket contact affects airlines in making route entry and exit decisions. In other 
words, it would be of our particular interest to examine whether airlines select routes 
that enable them to avoid or seek contact with “rival” carriers. An investigation of the 
competitive effect of multimarket contact in a dynamic setting will also provide an 
insight into the question: Under what circumstances does multimarket contact 
contribute to stable or unstable outcomes after new entries.  
 
The second essay in this dissertation focuses on the implementation of lateral 
transshipments among competing firms. The analytical model developed in this paper 
investigates the practice of transshipments between two competing stocking locations. 
It contributes to the existing literature on transshipments in several ways.  
 
First, many previous studies have modeled the performance impacts of environmental 
uncertainties, such as demand and lead time variability, and their implications for 
inventory management. The role of competition between firms in affecting the 
transshipment strategy and profitability outcomes has not received much attention. 




transshipment strategy in various competitive environments. The results suggest that 
transshipments may not be cost effective if the firms are operating in an environment 
that allows consumers to easily switch between firms. In such an environment, firms 
compete more intensely with one another and consumers have lower loyalty towards 
firms, both of which result in a high consumer’s switching rate.  
 
Second, the analysis incorporates the role that transshipment price plays in 
reallocating the benefits from transshipments between firms. It is found that the use of 
an appropriate level of transshipment price is an effective tool for firms to optimize 
their inventory level decision and maximize the performance improvement from 
transshipments. In particular, there exists a unique transshipment price that is optimal 
for both firms when the two firms are identical in market demand and inventory-
related cost parameters. However, it is shown that when the two firms are not 
identical, the smaller firm will prefer a lower transshipment price, and will achieve 
greater benefits from transshipments.  
 
Third, the consideration of asymmetric firm characteristics into the study of 
transshipments adds to the previous literature and enriches the managerial 
implications. The finding that transshipments are likely to provide asymmetric 
benefits when firms have asymmetric market demands suggests that transshipments 
actually enable the small firm to take a “free” ride on the great amount of inventory 
that the large firm holds. Moreover, the opportunity for such a free ride makes it 




transshipment price. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to design an effective 
incentive mechanism (e.g., side payments, flexible transshipment price) to make 
transshipments pay off for both firms.  
  
In the transshipment essay, both consumer switching rate and product price are 
considered as exogenous variables. The use of fixed, constant values for these 
variables makes the analytical solutions tractable and explicable. As an immediate 
future research, the practice of transshipments can viewed in a multi-stage sequential 
game modeling framework.  For example, firms make stock level decision in the first 
stage; the pricing decisions are made in the second stage by firms competing in the 
same market; and finally, firms decide whether to implement transshipments and 
what policy to follow in terms of the transshipment volume. In such a three-stage 
game theoretical model, both the price and inventory level decisions can be thought 
of as endogenous variables.  
 
On one side, the price of one firm relative to the other’s might affect the probability 
of a consumer’s switching firms. On the other side, the inventory level one firm holds 
relative to the other’s might affect the direction and the magnitude of transshipments. 
By incorporating the consumer’s utility function into the classic newsvendor model 
(see Dana and Petruzzi 2001 as an example), the price decision of firms can be jointly 






The analysis developed in the transshipment essay relies on a major assumption on 
the consumer switching behavior. According to this assumption, no consumers switch 
firms when transshipments are implemented in the event of stockout. However, it 
would be useful to extend the current model into other more complicated and 
dynamic situations. For example, consumers might switch before or after the 
occurrence of transshipments.  Since the performance impacts of transshipments are 
subject to the specification in the sequence of events, it would be important and 
necessary to examine transshipments in other hypothetical settings. In this aspect, 
there are great potentials for the simulation work to be developed in quantifying and 
validating the analytical results.  
 
Furthermore, it would be interesting to explore the implementation of transshipments 
in an empirical setting. Several interesting hypotheses can be developed and tested by 
integrating various perspectives in the fields such as operations management, 













Abreu, D. (1986), “External equilibria of oligopolistic supergames,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 39, 191-225. 
 
Axsater, Sven. 2003. A new decision rule for lateral transshipments in inventory  
system. Management Science 49 (9), 1168-1179.  
 
Baum, Joel A.C. and Korn, Helaine J. (1996), “Competitive dynamics of interfirm 
rivalry,” Academy of Management Journal, 39:2, 255-291. 
 
Baum, Joel A. C. and Korn, Helaine J. (1999), “Dynamics of dyadic competitive 
interaction,” Strategic Management Journal, 20, 251-278. 
 
Bernheim Douglas B and Whinston, Michael D. (1990), “Multimarket contact and 
collusive behavior,” Rand Journal of Economics, 21:1, 1-26. 
 
Brander, James A. and Zhang, Anming (1990), “Market conduct in the airline 
industry: an empirical investigation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 21:4, 567-583. 
 
Bulow, Jeremy I., Geanakopos, John D., and Klemperer, Paul D. (1985), 
“Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements,” The Journal of 
Political Economy, 93: 3, 488-511. 
 
Cohen, Morris, Cull, Carl, Lee, Hau, and Willen Don. 2000. Saturn’s supply-chain 
innovation: high value in after-sales service. Sloan Management Review Summer, 93- 
101. 
 
Dana, James D., Jr. and Petruzzi, Nicholas C. 2001. Note: The newsvendor model  





Dixit, Avinash (1979), “A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers,” 
Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 20-32. 
 
Dong, Lingxiu and Rudi, Nils. 2004. Who benefits from transshipment? exogenous  
vs. endogenous wholesale prices. Management Science 50 (5), 645-657. 
 
Dresner, Martin and Tretheway, M. (1992), “Modeling and testing the effect of 
market structure on price: the case of international air transport,” Journal of 
Transport, Economics and Policy, 26: 2, 171-184. 
 
Dresner, Martin and Windle, Robert (1996), “The impacts of low cost carriers on 
airport and route competition,” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 30: 3, 
309-328. 
 
Dresner, Martin and Windle, Robert (1999), “Competitive responses to low cost 
carrier entry,” Transportation Research E: The Logistics and Transportation Review, 
35, 59-75. 
 
Dresner, Martin, Windle, Robert and Yao, Yuliang (2001), “Airport barriers to entry 
in the US,”Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, forthcoming. 
 
Edwards, C.D. (1955), Conglomerate bigness as a source of market power. Business  
Concentration and Price Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Evans, William N. and Kessides, Ioannis N. (1994), “Living by the ‘golden rule’: 
multimarket contact in the U.S. airline industry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109(2), 341-366. 
 
Feinberg, Robert M. (1985), ““Sales-at-risk”: a test of the mutual forbearance theory 




Fernandez, Nerea and Marin, Pedro L. (1998), “Market power and multimarket 
contact: some evidence from the Spanish hotel industry,” The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, XLVI: 301-315. 
 
Fu, Xiaowen, Dresner, Martin, and Oum, Tae H. (2005), “Oligopoly competition with  
differentiated products: what happened after the effect of southwest’s entries 
stabilized,” Working paper, Sauder School of Business, University of British 
Columbia, December.  
 
Fuentelsaz, Lucio and Gomez, Jaime (2006), “Multipoint competition, strategic 
similarity and entry into geographic markets,” Strategic Management Journal, 27, 
477-499. 
 
Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean. 1991. Game Theory. The MIT Press. 
 
Gimeno, Javier and Woo, Carolyn Y. (1999), “Multimarket contact, economies of 
scope, and firm performance,” Academy of Management Journal, 43:3, 239-259. 
 
Gimeno, Javier (1999), “Reciprocal threats in multimarket rivalry: staking out 
‘spheres of influence’ in the U.S. airline industry,” Strategic Management Journal, 
20, 101-128. 
 
Gimeno, Javier (2002), “The performance effects of unintended and purposive 
multimarket contact,” Managerial and Decision Economics, 34: 209-224. 
 
Granot, Daniel and Sosic Greys. 2003. A three-stage model for a decentralized  
distribution system of retailers. Operations Research 51 (5), 771-784.  
 
Heggestad, Arnold A. and Rhoades, Stephen A. (1976), “Multi-market 
interdependence and local market competition in banking,” The Review of Economics 




Herer, Yale T. and Rashit, Ayelet. 1999. Lateral stock transshipments in a two- 
location inventory system with fixed and joint replenishment costs. Naval Research  
Logistics. 46 (5), 525-547. 
 
Hughes, Kirsty and Oughton, Christine (1993), “Diversification, multi-market contact 
and profitability,” Economica, 60: 203-224. 
 
Jans, I., and Rosenbaum, D. (1996), “Multimarket contact and pricing: evidence from 
the U.S. cement industry,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15: 391-
412. 
 
Jayachandran, Satish, Gimeno, Javier, and Varadarajan, P.Rajan (1999), “The theory 
of multimarket competition: a synthesis and implications for marketing strategy,” 
Journal of Marketing, 63, 49-66. 
 
Karnani, Aneel and Wernerfelt, Birger (1985), “Multiple point competition,” 
Strategic Management Journal, 6:1, 87-96. 
 
Krishnan, K. S. and Rao, V.K. 1965. Technical Notes: Inventory control in N  
warehouses. The Journal of Industrial Engineering May-June, 212-215.  
 
Li, Lode. 2002. Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition.  
Management Science 48 (9), 1196-1212. 
 
Mason, Charlotte H. and Perreault, William D. (1991), “Collinearity,  power, and 
interpretation of multiple regression analysis,” Journal of Marketing Research, 18, 
268-280. 
 
Morrison, Steven A., Winston, Clifford, Bailey, Elizabeth E., and Carlton, Dennis W. 
(1996), “Causes and consequences of airline fare wars,” Brookings Papers on 




Needham, Paul M. and Evers, Philip T.  1998. The influence of individual cost factors  
on the use of emergency transshipments. Trans. Res. – E (Logistics and Trans. Rev.)  
34 (2), 149-160.  
 
Parker, Philip M. and Roller, Lars-Hendrik (1997), “Collusive conduct in duopolies: 
multimarket contact and cross-ownership in the mobile telephone industry,” Rand 
Journal of Economics, 28:2, 304-322. 
 
Phillips, Owen R. and Mason, Charles F. (1992), “Mutual forbearance in 
experimental conglomerate markets,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23: 3, 395-414. 
 
Phillips, Owen R. and Mason, Charles F. (1996), “Market regulation and multimarket 
rivalry,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23:3, 395-414. 
 
Robinson, Lawrence W. 1990. Optimal and approximate policies in multiperiod,  
multilocation inventory models with transshipments. Operations Research 38 (2)  
278-295. 
 
Rosenbaum, David and Manns, Leslie (1994), “Cooperation v. rivalry and factors 
facilitating collusion,” Review of Industrial Organization, 9(6), December, 823-836.  
 
Rudi, Nils,  Kapur, Sandeep, and Pyke, David E. 2001. A two-location inventory  
model with transshipment and local decision making. Management Science 47 (12),  
1668-1680. 
 
Scott, John T. (1982), “Multimarket contact and economic performance,” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 64: 368-375. 
 
Singal, Vijay (1996), “Airline mergers and multimarket contact,” Managerial and 




Singh, Nirvikar and Vives, Xavier (1984), “Price and quantity competition in a 
differentiated duopoly,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15:4, 546- 554. 
 
Sivakumar, K. and Raj, S.P. (1997), “Quality tier competition: how price change 
influences brand choice and category choice,” Journal of Marketing, 61, 71-84. 
 
Tagaras, George. 1989. Effects of pooling on the optimization and service levels of  
two-location inventory systems. IIE Transactions 21(3), 250-257. 
 
Thomas, Charles J. and Willig, Robert D. (2004), “The risk of contagion from 
multimarket contact,” Working paper, Simon School of Business, University of 
Rochester; Princeton University, March. 
 
Xu, Kefeng, Evers, Philip T., and Fu, Michael C. 2003. Estimating customer service  
in a two-location continuous review inventory model with emergency transshipments.  
European Journal of Operations Research 145, 569-584.  
 
Weng, Z.K.  1995. Channel coordination and quantity discounts. Management  
Science 41, 1509-1522. 
 
Windle, Robert J and Dresner, Martin (1995), “The short and long run effects of entry 
on U.S. domestic air routes,” Transportation Journal, 35(2), pp.14-25.  
